The prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains one of the most dangerous flashpoints in global geopolitics. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway province that must be reunified with the mainland, potentially by force, while Taiwan maintains its de facto independence and democratic system. Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized “reunification” as a core national goal, directing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be capable of achieving it by 2027 if ordered.

A full-scale amphibious invasion, however, would be extraordinarily risky and complex. Recent wargames conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a prominent U.S. think tank, provide the most detailed open-source simulations of such a conflict. These exercises, drawing on military experts and realistic assumptions, suggest that while an invasion is possible, it would likely fail to achieve a quick Chinese victory—and at catastrophic cost to all parties.

The 2023 CSIS Invasion Wargame: A Pyrrhic Struggle

In its landmark 2023 report, “The First Battle of the Next War,” CSIS simulated a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan set in 2026, running the scenario 24 times with variations in capabilities, strategies, and alliances.

In the majority of iterations, Taiwan—supported by the United States and Japan—successfully repelled the invasion, preserving the island’s autonomy. China’s PLA failed to secure a foothold sufficient for full occupation.

Key reasons for this outcome include:

• The Taiwan Strait Challenge: Crossing the 100-mile strait represents one of the largest and most difficult amphibious operations in history. Only a limited number of beaches are suitable for landings, and Taiwan’s rugged terrain favors defenders. Monsoons, typhoons, and mined waters further complicate logistics.
• Taiwan’s Asymmetric Defenses: Taiwan’s “porcupine” strategy—emphasizing sea mines, anti-ship missiles, mobile artillery, and drones—inflicts heavy initial losses on invading forces. Ground troops resist fiercely on beaches and in urban areas.
• U.S. and Japanese Intervention: American submarines, long-range bombers, and anti-ship missiles devastate China’s amphibious fleet and surface navy from bases in Japan, Guam, and beyond. Japan provides critical basing and logistical support.

Even in scenarios where China achieved partial success, the costs were staggering:

• United States: Losses of 2–3 aircraft carriers, 10–20 warships, hundreds of aircraft, and 3,000–10,000 casualties in weeks.
• China: Over 100 major surface ships sunk, amphibious forces crippled, 150+ aircraft destroyed, and tens of thousands of troops killed or captured. Such losses could threaten the stability of the Chinese Communist Party.
• Taiwan: Severe economic devastation, destroyed infrastructure (including power grids and ports), and thousands of military casualties, though civilian resistance plays a key role.
• Japan: Strikes on its bases and contributing forces result in significant losses.

The wargames highlighted vulnerabilities like ground-based aircraft losses but underscored that rapid U.S. intervention and Taiwanese resilience are decisive deterrents.

The Rising Threat of Blockade: Insights from 2025 CSIS Simulations

More recent analyses suggest a full invasion may not be China’s preferred option. In July 2025, CSIS released “Lights Out? Wargaming a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan,” simulating 26 scenarios of a non-invasive blockade—disrupting Taiwan’s sea and air links without landing troops.

Blockades have become more plausible, as evidenced by China’s increasing drills simulating encirclement and port isolation. Outcomes varied, but key findings include:

• China could severely disrupt Taiwan’s imports (especially energy, as the island produces little domestically), potentially reducing electricity generation to critical lows and halting manufacturing—including advanced semiconductors vital to the global economy.
• Breaking a blockade risks escalating into major naval battles, with high casualties on both sides.
• Prolonged blockades give the U.S. and allies time to mobilize convoys or escorts, but economic fallout would be immense worldwide.
• Taiwan’s resilience depends on stockpiles, infrastructure hardening, and public conservation efforts.

Experts note that blockades offer China a “gray zone” coercion tool—pressuring Taiwan toward concessions without immediate full war—though escalation remains a grave risk.

Broader Risks and Deterrence

Any conflict carries escalation dangers: Chinese strikes on U.S. bases in Japan or Guam, cyberattacks, or—in worst cases—nuclear threats if Beijing faces existential defeat. Global supply chains, particularly semiconductors (Taiwan produces over 90% of the world’s advanced chips), would collapse, triggering economic chaos.

Despite heightened rhetoric and military buildup, as of early January 2026, tensions remain managed through deterrence rather than direct confrontation. Recent large-scale Chinese drills in late 2025 simulated blockades but stopped short of provocation that would force a response. Taiwan continues to bolster defenses, including increased spending and asymmetric capabilities, while the U.S. provides arms and reaffirms commitment to peace across the strait.

Expert consensus holds that China lacks an easy path to victory. Amphibious assaults are historically rare and failure-prone, and even “successful” outcomes would likely be pyrrhic. Coercive measures like blockades or gray-zone tactics appear more likely in the near term, aimed at wearing down Taiwanese resolve without triggering full U.S. intervention.

These scenarios are hypothetical, based on think-tank wargames and open-source intelligence—not predictions. Strong deterrence, including allied preparations and Taiwanese resilience, continues to make aggression unappealing for Beijing. Yet the risks underscore the need for diplomacy to prevent miscalculation in one of the world’s most volatile regions.

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