Why the US is Concerned About Venezuela’s New Leader Delcy Rodriguez
The United States finds itself increasingly concerned about Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela’s interim president, less than a month after she assumed power following the dramatic U.S. military capture of former President Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026.
Rodríguez, who served as Maduro’s vice president and minister of oil, was sworn in as acting president on January 5, 2026, in accordance with constitutional succession rules. The Trump administration initially backed her rise to power as a pragmatic step to ensure stability in the oil-rich nation and prevent a power vacuum or chaos in the aftermath of Maduro’s removal. Reports indicate that Rodríguez and key regime figures, including her brother Jorge Rodríguez (president of the National Assembly), had privately assured U.S. and Qatari intermediaries of their willingness to cooperate before the operation, signaling a potential shift away from Maduro’s hardline stance.
The U.S. facilitated her interim leadership with expectations of swift alignment on core strategic priorities: expanded American access to Venezuela’s vast oil reserves, economic reforms to attract foreign investment, and a decisive break from adversarial influences in the Western Hemisphere. These include severing or significantly reducing ties with Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba—such as expelling their diplomats, advisers, and security personnel—and ending practices like subsidized oil exports to allies like Cuba.
However, these expectations have quickly given way to growing doubts and frustration in Washington. U.S. intelligence assessments, as reported in late January 2026, express uncertainty over whether Rodríguez is “fully on board” with the administration’s strategy. Despite her swearing-in ceremony being attended by representatives from Russia, China, and Iran, she has not publicly announced any formal ruptures with these countries. This hesitation has fueled concerns that she may prioritize domestic political survival—balancing Maduro loyalists (Chavistas) within the military, security forces, and bureaucracy—over full compliance with U.S. demands.
Public statements from Rodríguez have only heightened tensions. In a speech to oil workers in Puerto La Cruz on January 26, 2026, broadcast on state television, she declared she had “enough” of Washington’s “orders” regarding Venezuelan politicians, rebuking perceived U.S. interference while attempting to rally domestic support. Such defiant rhetoric contrasts with earlier cooperative gestures, including the release of around 250 political prisoners (out of an estimated 800+ held under Maduro) and authorization for oil sales to the U.S., including a 50-million-barrel supply deal with initial payments received.
Adding to U.S. unease is Rodríguez’s long-standing association with the Maduro regime. A former “priority target” for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration due to alleged involvement in drug trafficking networks, she has faced U.S. sanctions in the past and is viewed by critics—including bipartisan senators and opposition figures—as emblematic of the “corrupt ruling elite.” During a January 28, 2026, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio described engagement with her as strictly temporary, emphasizing that the administration has “no plans to let Venezuela’s corrupt ruling elite cling to power indefinitely.” He stressed that Rodríguez’s political future hinges on alignment with U.S. objectives, warning that failure to deliver could prompt further pressure, though he downplayed immediate additional military action.
The situation underscores broader U.S. strategic goals in Venezuela: securing preferential oil access to bolster energy security, reducing geopolitical rivals’ footholds in Latin America, and achieving long-term stability. Yet critics argue the approach risks entrenching regime remnants rather than enabling a genuine democratic transition—such as empowering opposition leaders like María Corina Machado or Edmundo González, recognized by some as legitimate winners of the disputed 2024 election.
As of late January 2026, the dynamic remains fluid. While communications between Washington and Caracas are described as “respectful and productive” by Rubio, with Venezuela agreeing to submit monthly budgets tied to oil revenues for U.S. oversight, intelligence doubts and Rodríguez’s public pushback signal persistent friction. The Trump administration’s leverage—through sanctions relief, oil deals, and the implicit threat of further intervention—will likely determine whether this interim arrangement evolves into cooperation or renewed confrontation.
About The Author
