In early 2026, Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivered a stark message to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA): no one is untouchable, not even his closest allies. The January announcement that General Zhang Youxia, the senior vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and long considered Xi’s most trusted military confidant, along with General Liu Zhenli, chief of the Joint Staff Department, were under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law” sent shockwaves through China’s opaque political system.
This development left the CMC—China’s supreme military decision-making body—hollowed out, with only Xi as chairman and one remaining vice chairman, General Zhang Shengmin, who oversees discipline. Of the seven CMC members Xi personally appointed following the 2022 Party Congress, five have now been purged in just over three years. The removals extend far beyond the CMC, encompassing dozens of senior officers across the PLA’s branches, including the Rocket Force, navy, air force, and political commissars.
These actions, officially framed as anti-corruption campaigns, reveal a pattern of profound institutional mistrust. Xi has targeted figures he elevated himself, including childhood associates like Zhang Youxia (whose father fought alongside Xi’s father) and other loyalists such as former defense minister General Li Shangfu, CMC Vice Chairman General He Weidong, and Political Work Department head Admiral Miao Hua. Accusations against Zhang and Liu were particularly pointed: they allegedly “betrayed the trust” of the party, undermined Xi’s authority under the “chairman responsibility system,” fostered corruption, and damaged the PLA’s political loyalty, ecology, and combat readiness.
Analysts interpret this as evidence of Xi’s paranoia and a drive for absolute personal control. Foreign Policy described it as a “system of permanent insecurity,” where Xi treats military leaders with greater severity than civilian officials. U.S. intelligence assessments highlight Xi’s “remarkable level of fear,” leading to mass purges that decimate experienced command structures. Comparisons to historical figures like Stalin have emerged, with observers noting that the purges resemble efforts to engineer total obedience through fear rather than genuine reform.
The consequences are significant. The PLA’s top ranks have been ravaged to an extent unseen since the Mao era, disrupting modernization efforts, exposing corruption in critical areas like missile systems, and raising doubts about operational effectiveness. Senior generals with combat experience, such as Zhang and Liu (veterans of border conflicts with Vietnam), have been replaced amid a climate where loyalty trumps competence. This environment fosters sycophancy over candid advice, potentially impairing decision-making in crises.
Particularly concerning are implications for high-stakes ambitions, such as readiness for a Taiwan contingency. Xi has reportedly demanded the PLA be capable of winning such a conflict by 2027, yet the purges suggest dissatisfaction with progress and reliability. As one analysis noted, the removals indicate Xi may question whether his generals can be trusted to execute ambitious operations without deviation or failure.
While Xi has consolidated unprecedented personal power over the military—transforming the CMC into an extension of his will—the approach carries risks. A leadership vacuum filled by less experienced or overly cautious officers could degrade readiness and invite miscalculation. The PLA endures in silence, with no visible resistance, underscoring the success of Xi’s control mechanisms but also the brittleness of a system built on pervasive distrust.
In the end, Xi’s relentless purges affirm his grip but expose a fundamental tension: a supreme leader who commands the world’s largest military yet appears unable to fully trust its generals. This dynamic defines China’s current military landscape—one of centralized authority shadowed by institutional insecurity.
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