India’s foreign policy has evolved significantly in recent years, particularly since 2014 under the Modi government. The transition from the Look East Policy (launched in the 1990s) to the more dynamic Act East Policy (AEP) marked a proactive push toward deeper economic, strategic, and security engagement with Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region. Complementing this is the Neighbourhood First approach, which seeks stronger ties with immediate neighbors like Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan, and Nepal.
Central to these policies is Northeast India—a cluster of eight states including Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram, and Sikkim. Geographically positioned as India’s natural gateway to ASEAN countries, the Northeast is envisioned as a bridge for enhanced connectivity, trade, and regional integration. Initiatives such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, and transit routes through Bangladesh aim to overcome the region’s historical isolation, often symbolized by the narrow “Chicken’s Neck” (Siliguri Corridor). These efforts promise to transform the Northeast from a peripheral area into a vibrant economic hub, countering China’s growing influence while fostering local development.
Despite these ambitions, recent developments reveal substantial risks, with the Northeast bearing disproportionate costs from geopolitical volatility, diplomatic setbacks, and internal challenges.
Geopolitical instability in neighboring countries remains a primary obstacle. Myanmar’s civil war, intensified since the 2021 military coup, has turned potential land bridges into dead ends. Key projects like the Kaladan corridor are stalled, with ethnic armed groups controlling border areas such as Paletwa township (captured in early 2024). The Trilateral Highway has repeatedly missed deadlines, with no firm resumption in sight. This not only halts promised economic benefits—faster trade routes and reduced costs—but also fuels spillover effects: refugee inflows, arms smuggling, and cross-border militancy, particularly affecting states like Manipur.
Bangladesh’s political upheaval adds another layer of disruption. The August 2024 ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s pro-India Awami League government, followed by an interim administration under Muhammad Yunus, has strained bilateral ties. Anti-India sentiment, debates over Hasina’s extradition, and border tensions have placed connectivity projects in limbo. India’s reliance on Bangladeshi ports (Chattogram and Mongla) and transit agreements to bypass the Siliguri Corridor is now vulnerable. Strained relations risk isolating the Northeast economically and complicating initiatives like the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement.
Domestic policies have sometimes clashed with these diplomatic goals. Efforts like the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam, aimed at addressing illegal immigration concerns, have historically strained ties with Dhaka despite earlier successes such as the 2015 Land Boundary Agreement. Nationalist domestic priorities can undermine sustained neighborly cooperation, creating openings for China to expand influence through aid and infrastructure in the region.
Infrastructure deficits and implementation gaps persist as chronic issues. Despite increased funding—schemes like NESIDS, PM-DevINE, and railway upgrades—the Northeast faces poor roads, limited rail and air links, difficult terrain, bureaucratic delays, and uneven development. Insurgency remnants and ethnic tensions further complicate progress, turning strategic ambitions into slow, uneven realities.
Security dynamics have intensified as a result. Heightened focus on the Northeast as a frontier zone has led to greater militarization and border hardening, including rethinking the Free Movement Regime with Myanmar. While aimed at curbing threats like irregular migration and transnational crime, this can exacerbate local grievances, fuel ethnic conflicts (as seen in ongoing Manipur issues since 2023), and create perceptions of marginalization when development feels imposed rather than inclusive.
Broader foreign policy trade-offs compound these challenges. India’s balancing act in US-China rivalry, its withdrawal from RCEP, and emphasis on Indo-Pacific security sometimes divert resources from Northeast-specific needs. As neighbors hold elections in 2026 amid their own instabilities, the risk of further spillover—insurgencies, communal tensions, or external interference—looms large.
In essence, while India’s foreign policy shifts hold immense long-term promise for the Northeast—positioning it as a production node in regional value chains, with investments in sectors like bamboo, agro-processing, and connectivity—the region currently absorbs significant short- to medium-term costs. External disruptions, diplomatic strains, and internal shortcomings mean that strategic national priorities often translate into local vulnerabilities without equivalent gains.
For the Northeast to truly benefit, a recalibrated approach is essential: prioritizing inclusive, people-centric development; accelerating robust, locally sensitive infrastructure; pursuing adaptive diplomacy; and resolving ethnic and security conflicts. Without these, the Act East vision risks leaving the Northeast to shoulder the burdens of India’s eastward ambitions while waiting for the promised dividends. Recent analyses underscore that instability in Bangladesh and Myanmar represents major headwinds, demanding urgent, context-specific strategies to turn potential into progress.
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