Ex-CIA Agent Reveals: “The U.S. Was Waiting for India to Attack Pakistan” — Inside America’s Secret Expectations of a South Asian War
A Revelation from the Shadows
When former CIA officer John Kiriakou spoke out recently, few expected his remarks to reignite one of South Asia’s most sensitive geopolitical debates. Kiriakou, who served over fifteen years in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and played a pivotal role in counter-terror operations across Pakistan and the Middle East, made a startling claim: “The U.S. was waiting for India to attack Pakistan.”
According to Kiriakou, Washington intelligence circles were certain that India would launch a retaliatory strike following major terrorist incidents — notably after the 2001 Indian Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. These, he said, were moments when “everyone in the CIA believed” a war between the two nuclear-armed neighbors was imminent.
The former officer’s remarks — covered by Hindustan Times, Times of India, NDTV, and Livemint — shine a light on how closely the United States monitored, and in some ways anticipated, a potential India-Pakistan war. But beyond the headline, Kiriakou’s account offers rare insight into how Washington viewed Pakistan’s military leadership, India’s strategic restraint, and the fragile equilibrium that has kept the subcontinent from tipping into full-scale war.
“We Were Sure India Would Strike”
Kiriakou’s statement was blunt: “We were sure India would retaliate. We had our analysts and defense planners on alert for days.”
He recalled that during the early 2000s, the U.S. intelligence community braced itself for an Indian military response to terrorist strikes emanating from Pakistani soil. After the 2001 Parliament attack, the George W. Bush administration reportedly believed India had reached its limit of patience. Washington’s embassies and defense staff across South Asia were placed on “conflict watch,” expecting Indian forces to mobilize toward the border.
But to the surprise of many in Langley and the Pentagon, New Delhi chose restraint. Kiriakou claimed that this decision — viewed in Washington as both puzzling and strategic — prevented a potential catastrophe between two nuclear powers.
The scenario repeated itself seven years later after 26/11, when ten heavily armed Pakistani militants launched coordinated assaults in Mumbai. “We thought it was over,” Kiriakou admitted, referring to the possibility of war. “We believed India would hit back — and hard. But they didn’t.”
The U.S.–Pakistan Connection: Buying an Ally
In his broader remarks, Kiriakou also addressed another explosive subject — the nature of U.S. relations with Pakistan’s then-leader, General Pervez Musharraf. According to him, the U.S. effectively “purchased” Pakistan’s cooperation during the War on Terror.
“Washington loves working with dictators,” he said. “We paid Musharraf millions to ensure Pakistan stayed on our side.”
The payments, he claimed, were justified as counterterrorism assistance but were, in practice, designed to secure loyalty and limit Pakistan’s nuclear risk. Kiriakou suggested that U.S. intelligence agencies had “some level of oversight” or influence over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, ensuring it didn’t fall into extremist hands.
These comments, while consistent with long-standing reports of U.S. military aid to Islamabad, also underline the cynicism of American realpolitik: cooperation with an authoritarian ally to control a volatile nuclear-armed state — even while expecting it might one day be attacked by its democratic neighbor.
Pakistan Would Lose a Conventional War
Kiriakou didn’t mince words about Pakistan’s military position either.
“Nothing good will come of an actual war between India and Pakistan,” he stated. “Because the Pakistanis will lose.”
He argued that while Pakistan’s military remains powerful domestically, it lacks the conventional strength to match India’s size, economy, and technology. “The only card Pakistan holds is nuclear,” he said, “and that makes every crisis a potential global threat.”
From Washington’s perspective, this asymmetry made the subcontinent one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the world. U.S. analysts believed a limited war — or even a miscalculated strike — could spiral out of control. The CIA’s concern, therefore, wasn’t just regional instability but the possibility of nuclear escalation.
Expectation or Encouragement? The Fine Line
The key phrase — “the U.S. was waiting for India to attack” — has ignited debate about whether Washington merely expected a strike or desired it.
The nuance matters. The media reporting shows Kiriakou using the words “expected” and “were sure,” but not explicitly that Washington wanted war. Still, in intelligence culture, expectation can influence policy — especially when it shapes diplomatic postures or military readiness.
During both the 2001 and 2008 crises, U.S. diplomats engaged in intense shuttle diplomacy between New Delhi and Islamabad, urging restraint while also securing Pakistan’s cooperation against terrorism. Some analysts now argue that this dual posture — warning against escalation while maintaining control over Pakistan’s military — effectively positioned the U.S. as a quiet broker waiting to see how India would act.
The American Dilemma: Between Two Rivals
The U.S. has long faced a strategic contradiction in South Asia. On one hand, it values India as a democratic partner and a counterweight to China. On the other, it relies on Pakistan for intelligence access, Afghanistan logistics, and counter-terror operations.
Kiriakou’s account reveals how this tightrope diplomacy worked in real time. “We couldn’t afford to lose Pakistan,” he said, “but we also couldn’t ignore India.”
That balancing act often led to frustration in New Delhi, where policymakers felt Washington downplayed Pakistan’s support for militant groups. For Islamabad, meanwhile, U.S. aid became both a lifeline and a leash — sustaining the military elite but fueling resentment among civilians who saw themselves as pawns in a larger game.
Echoes in Modern Policy
Kiriakou’s remarks resonate in today’s geopolitical climate. In recent months, reports have surfaced of renewed U.S. involvement in South Asia’s security dialogues, with some American officials acknowledging that tensions between India and Pakistan remain a “persistent nuclear danger.”
In May 2025, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance reportedly cautioned India against actions that could “trigger a regional war,” even as the U.S. confirmed that Pakistan had attempted a major cross-border attack — foiled by Indian forces. This blend of deterrence, intelligence sharing, and quiet diplomacy shows that Washington’s approach, two decades later, remains fundamentally the same: expecting the worst, while hoping for restraint.
A Mirror to U.S. Foreign Policy
Kiriakou’s confessions reveal more than historical curiosity; they expose the moral ambiguity of American strategy. The U.S., he implies, was less an arbiter of peace and more a manager of crisis — prepared for India to act but unwilling to stop funding the very regime it distrusted.
It’s a pattern familiar across U.S. interventions: support both sides enough to prevent collapse, but never enough to resolve the conflict. Whether in the Middle East, Latin America, or South Asia, such strategies ensure control without closure — influence without stability.
Between Expectation and Provocation
The statement “the U.S. was waiting for India to attack Pakistan” captures a deeper truth about American intelligence thinking during the post-9/11 era. Washington didn’t want an India-Pakistan war — but it planned for one. It was a silent readiness born of realism, not desire.
Kiriakou’s candid admission, therefore, serves as a reminder of how fragile peace in South Asia truly is — balanced not only by diplomacy between New Delhi and Islamabad but also by the expectations, calculations, and anxieties of far-off powers watching from across the ocean.
As India rises as a global power and the U.S. recalibrates its Asian alliances, Kiriakou’s words echo like a warning: that America’s gaze on South Asia has always been one of both interest and anticipation — a readiness for war that, thankfully, has so far remained only an expectation.
About The Author
