If the Iran War Expands: Whose Boots Will Be on the Ground?

The conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran—launched with joint airstrikes on February 28, 2026, under Operation Epic Fury—has primarily involved intense aerial bombardment, missile exchanges, naval strikes, and drone attacks. As of early March 2026, no large-scale ground invasion has occurred, with the war entering its second week focused on degrading Iran’s military leadership, nuclear facilities, air defenses, and ballistic missile capabilities. However, if the war escalates further—potentially toward full regime change, securing nuclear sites, or countering widespread proxy retaliation—the deployment of ground forces could become a reality. Official statements and expert assessments suggest any such involvement would be limited rather than a massive occupation like Iraq in 2003, due to political aversion to prolonged wars, logistical challenges in Iran’s terrain, and public fatigue from past Middle East conflicts.
President Donald Trump has repeatedly left the door open for U.S. ground troops “if necessary,” while emphasizing that the campaign aims to avoid endless entanglements. In interviews, Trump stated he does not rule out boots on the ground but views large-scale deployments as a “waste of time” given Iran’s weakened state after losing key naval assets and leadership figures, including the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has echoed this stance, confirming no U.S. troops are currently inside Iran but refusing to exclude future options, while insisting the conflict will not become an “endless” war. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has highlighted preemptive strikes to protect U.S. forces from anticipated retaliation, though he and others in the administration prioritize air and special operations over mass infantry commitments.
The most likely form of U.S. ground involvement would involve limited special forces or small contingents for targeted missions, such as securing nuclear facilities or critical infrastructure during a potential transitional phase. Discussions within the administration have explored this narrowly scoped approach, with reports indicating Trump has privately shown interest in such deployments despite public caution. To minimize direct American exposure, the U.S. has considered proxy forces, including outreach to Kurdish militias in Iraq and Iran to act as ground operatives. This aligns with a strategy of arming and supporting local groups to handle fighting on the ground, reducing the need for U.S. divisions.
Israel, as a co-belligerent, could deploy ground forces in limited scenarios, particularly if escalation spills into bordering areas. Israeli troops have already conducted operations in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah in response to breaches of the 2024 ceasefire, and further strikes or incursions remain possible if proxy fronts intensify. However, a direct Israeli ground push deep into Iran is improbable given the distance and reliance on U.S. air superiority.
On the defensive side, Iran has prepared for potential invasions, with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declaring that Iranian forces—including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij militias—are “waiting” and “capable” of fierce ground resistance. Tehran has vowed heavy casualties for any invading troops, viewing a ground war as an opportunity to inflict damage through asymmetric tactics in mountainous and urban terrain.
Regional actors could contribute if directly threatened. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have positioned for possible responses to Iranian attacks on their infrastructure or ports, though they prefer to avoid deep involvement to protect economic stability. Pakistan has reportedly moved troops toward its border with Iran and engaged in talks with Gulf and Western allies, raising questions about limited support roles.
Other players remain on the sidelines for ground commitments. European allies, including the UK and France, provide aerial, intelligence, and naval support but show no inclination toward troop deployments. Russia and China offer indirect aid—such as intelligence or hardware—to Iran but are unlikely to send forces. Ethnic insurgents, such as Baloch or Iranian Kurdish groups, could emerge as armed proxies if encouraged.
In essence, an expanded war would probably feature a combination of U.S. and Israeli special operations, proxy militias like Kurds, and Iran’s defensive ground forces rather than a full U.S.-led invasion. Trump and his team stress that airstrikes and internal Iranian opposition could drive regime change without massive American boots on the ground, with the Iranian people potentially serving as the ultimate “boots” for change. Yet experts warn that achieving lasting objectives like regime collapse or nuclear dismantlement may prove difficult without some ground presence, risking higher costs and another prolonged Middle East commitment despite administration assurances to the contrary.