Commando Raid To Secure Iran’s Enriched Uranium May Become A Very Risky Necessity

As the ongoing conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran intensifies, discussions within U.S. and Israeli military and intelligence circles have turned to one of the most audacious and perilous options yet: a special operations ground raid to secure or neutralize Iran’s remaining stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU).
Recent airstrikes by U.S. and Israeli forces, which began in June 2025 and have continued into 2026, targeted key Iranian nuclear facilities including Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. These operations inflicted severe damage on enrichment infrastructure, rendering many sites inoperable based on satellite imagery and intelligence assessments. However, a significant portion of Iran’s near-weapons-grade uranium—enriched to approximately 60% purity—appears to have survived. Much of this material is believed to be stored in deep underground bunkers and tunnels, particularly at Isfahan, where narrow access points may still allow recovery despite the bombardment.
U.S. intelligence officials have expressed growing concern that Iran, or potentially opportunistic non-state actors amid the chaos, could retrieve and further enrich this stockpile to weapons-grade levels (90% or higher). Pre-strike estimates placed Iran’s holdings at around 440-450 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, sufficient—if processed—to produce fissile material for roughly 10-11 nuclear weapons in a matter of weeks to months. With IAEA inspections severely restricted or halted since mid-2025, uncertainties about the exact location and status of the material have fueled urgency in Washington and Jerusalem.
Multiple reports from outlets including The War Zone, Axios, Bloomberg, The New York Times, and others indicate that deliberations over a commando-style operation have accelerated in recent days. The Trump administration has explored two primary approaches: physically extracting the uranium canisters for removal from Iran, or deploying nuclear experts—potentially including IAEA-affiliated specialists—to dilute or down-blend the material on-site, rendering it unusable for weapons.
President Donald Trump addressed the possibility directly when questioned by reporters aboard Air Force One. While not committing to immediate action, he did not rule out ground forces, stating they might be deployed “for a very good reason” and adding, “At some point maybe we will.” He emphasized that current efforts focus on degrading Iranian capabilities through air power, but left open the door for future ground involvement to address the nuclear material.
Such a mission would likely involve elite U.S. units like Delta Force or Navy SEALs, possibly in coordination with Israeli special forces, which have a proven track record in subterranean raids. U.S. and Israeli operators have trained extensively for scenarios involving hard and deeply buried targets, including mock enemy bunkers. However, experts describe this potential operation as “the mother of all commando raids,” citing extraordinary challenges:
- Insertion into heavily defended Iranian territory during active hostilities.
- Navigation and operations in fortified underground complexes with limited access.
- Handling radioactive material, requiring specialized equipment, protective gear, and technical expertise for safe extraction or neutralization.
- Potential need for supporting forces to secure perimeters, adding to the troop footprint and logistical demands.
- Risks of heavy casualties, mission compromise, escalation to broader ground war, or unintended release of radioactive substances.
Analysts from think tanks like the Stimson Center and Arms Control Association have warned that air strikes alone may not suffice to eliminate the threat posed by recoverable HEU. One expert noted that retrieving buried canisters would demand not just commandos but heavy equipment and on-site specialists, transforming a raid into a complex, high-stakes endeavor.
The situation remains highly fluid, with no confirmed plans or timelines for such an operation. Discussions appear contingency-based, driven by intelligence indicating the material’s vulnerability rather than imminent action. Yet as the conflict evolves and Iran’s regime faces mounting pressure, securing this enriched uranium could shift from a hypothetical worst-case scenario to a perceived necessity—albeit one fraught with immense strategic, operational, and humanitarian risks.
The coming weeks may clarify whether diplomacy, continued airstrikes, or boots on the ground become the path forward in preventing Iran’s nuclear breakout amid regional turmoil.