India Defies Claims of Capitulation: Continues Importing 1.1 Million Barrels of Russian Oil Daily Amid U.S. Pressure
In a sharp rebuttal to widespread speculation and opposition narratives, political commentator Anand Ranganathan has dismantled assertions that India has succumbed to American demands and halted its purchases of Russian crude oil.
Appearing in an excerpt from The Times of India’s Sunday Scrutiny segment (aired around early March 2026), Ranganathan directly addressed viral claims circulating on social media and in political circles. These claims suggested that New Delhi had “caved” or capitulated to Washington, allegedly stopping or drastically reducing imports of Russian oil following pressure from the United States.
Ranganathan countered these assertions with clear facts: India continues to import approximately 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd) of Russian crude. He emphasized that no official announcement, policy shift, or formal decision has been made by the Indian government to cease these purchases. “Despite U.S. pressure, India did not change its policy,” he stated, firmly rejecting the notion that New Delhi had bowed to external influence.
The controversy stems partly from remarks by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who claimed that Washington had urged India to stop buying Russian oil and that India had complied. Such statements fueled accusations from critics, including sections of the opposition, portraying India’s energy decisions as a sign of weakened strategic autonomy.
Ranganathan highlighted the disconnect between these claims and reality. India’s reliance on discounted Russian crude has been a key element of its energy strategy since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022. Russian supplies have often accounted for 30-40% of India’s total crude imports in recent years, helping the country save billions of dollars through lower prices compared to global benchmarks.
Recent developments, including geopolitical tensions in the Middle East (such as disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and related conflicts), have added complexity. Reports indicate that Russia’s share in India’s imports dipped temporarily in early 2026 (to around 19-21% in January) amid tariff concerns and alternative sourcing, but rebounded in February, with Russia remaining the top supplier. Industry sources noted Russia’s readiness to divert cargoes to India to offset potential shortfalls elsewhere.
Government sources have consistently maintained that India never required permission from any foreign power to source energy. Statements reaffirm that purchases from Russia continued uninterrupted into February and March 2026, with no dependency on U.S. waivers for routine imports—though temporary exemptions were noted in specific contexts related to stranded shipments and global stability.
Ranganathan’s intervention underscores a broader point: India’s energy policy prioritizes national interest and economic pragmatism over external dictates. By continuing steady imports at around 1.1 million bpd, New Delhi demonstrates independence in navigating great-power pressures while securing affordable energy for its growing economy.
As global oil markets remain volatile, India’s balanced approach—maintaining ties with Russia while engaging constructively with the U.S.—continues to draw both praise for strategic foresight and criticism from those pushing alternative narratives. The facts, as Ranganathan argued, speak louder than the speculation.