As the U.S.-Israel military campaign against Iran continues in March 2026, President Donald Trump and his administration are actively considering one of the most audacious and dangerous operations of the conflict: sending American ground troops deep into Iran to seize or neutralize the country’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU).
This is not a quick special-forces raid seen in movies. Defense officials, nuclear experts, and military planners describe it as an extraordinarily complex, high-risk mission that could span multiple sites, last weeks, expose U.S. troops to combat and radiological hazards, and risk significant escalation. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stated bluntly that the material “cannot simply be bombed away” — “People are going to have to go and get it.”
The Target: Iran’s Near-Weapons-Grade Uranium Stockpile
Iran possesses roughly 400–450 kilograms (about 880–990 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60% — near weapons-grade (90% is typically needed for a bomb). This material is stored as uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) gas in large, heavy cylinders resembling scuba tanks, often housed inside thick cement vats or deep underground tunnels.
The bulk of the stockpile is believed to be at the Isfahan nuclear facility, with possible additional amounts at Natanz and Fordow. Many sites were damaged in earlier U.S.-Israeli airstrikes in 2025, leaving some canisters buried under rubble in mountain tunnels too deep for conventional bunker-busters to guarantee destruction. The UF₆ gas is highly toxic and corrosive; a breach could release deadly fumes, while mishandling could risk unintended criticality if canisters are brought too close together.
Experts estimate the current stockpile could theoretically be further enriched into material for multiple nuclear weapons, making its control a central U.S. objective in preventing Iran from ever acquiring a bomb.
How the Operation Would Unfold
Planning draws on elite U.S. units and specialized nuclear-response teams. The mission would likely proceed in phases:
- Preparation and Softening Targets
Extensive airstrikes would first target Iranian air defenses, command nodes, and any visible forces around the nuclear sites to create a safer window for insertion. Reports indicate the Pentagon has prepared to deploy up to 3,000 troops from the 82nd Airborne Division — specialists in rapid “joint forcible entry” — to the region as potential backup or to secure perimeters. - Insertion of Forces
Nighttime operations would involve elite units from Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), including Delta Force, SEAL Team 6, and Army Rangers, inserted by helicopter or parachute. Israeli special forces might participate in coordination. The goal: rapidly secure the sites amid potential Iranian resistance. - Securing and Handling the Material
Once on site, teams would establish perimeters while Nuclear Disablement Teams (from the U.S. Army’s 20th CBRNE Command) move in. These specialists are trained to handle radiological and chemical threats under combat conditions, using radiation detectors, protective hazmat gear, and decontamination equipment. At damaged or buried facilities, troops might need heavy equipment to excavate collapsed tunnels or entrances. The canisters — each weighing up to dozens of pounds and containing up to about 55 pounds of material — must be carefully extracted without breaching them. Up to 1,000 or more personnel could be required on-site for security and logistics at major facilities like Isfahan, according to some assessments. - Extraction or Neutralization
Options include:
- Physically removing the cylinders by heavy-lift aircraft for transport to a secure U.S. facility (possibly involving the Department of Energy for dilution or down-blending).
- Diluting the material on-site to reduce its enrichment level.
- Entombing it by further collapsing tunnels and entrances, rendering it inaccessible for years without major Iranian recovery efforts.
The full operation across dispersed, fortified sites could take several weeks, not hours.
The Enormous Risks Involved
Military and nuclear experts widely describe the mission as “extremely risky” and potentially “infeasible” without major costs:
- Combat Risks: Iranian forces would likely mount a fierce defense, leading to expected U.S. casualties. Operating deep inside hostile territory under possible missile, drone, or ground attacks adds layers of danger.
- Radiological and Chemical Hazards: Troops in full protective gear must move fragile, heavy canisters through rugged terrain, possibly while under fire. A single puncture could release toxic UF₆ gas.
- Logistical Challenges: Sites are spread out, some deeply buried under mountains or rubble. Planning might occur with short notice.
- Escalation: Iran has rejected Trump’s reported 15-point peace proposal and vowed retaliation. A ground incursion could widen the conflict dramatically.
International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Rafael Grossi has called it “a very challenging operation,” while former officials and analysts warn of the potential for high troop losses and unintended consequences. Some describe it as possibly the largest special operations mission in history.
Alternatives and Current Status
A less ambitious approach could rely more heavily on precision strikes to further entomb the material underground rather than full extraction. Trump has indicated the operation is “an option on the table” but has not ordered it as of late March 2026. Troop movements, including potential 82nd Airborne deployments, are reportedly in preparation, while diplomatic efforts continue amid Iranian rejection of U.S. demands for zero enrichment and full dismantlement of nuclear capabilities.
In essence, seizing Iran’s nuclear fuel would represent a massive test of U.S. military reach and technical expertise — far beyond simple destruction from the air. Success could neutralize a major proliferation threat; failure could come at a steep human and strategic price. The coming days and weeks will determine whether this high-stakes plot moves from planning to execution.
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