Saudi, UAE, and Iraq Pipelines: Can They Help Oil Bypass the Strait of Hormuz?
The Strait of Hormuz, the narrow chokepoint between Iran and Oman, has long been the world’s most critical energy artery. Normally, around 17–21 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude oil and petroleum products — roughly 20% of global seaborne oil trade — flow through it, with the vast majority destined for Asian markets.
In the ongoing 2026 crisis triggered by U.S.-Israeli actions against Iran, the strait has faced effective disruptions and blockades, forcing Gulf producers to scramble for alternatives. Three key pipelines from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq have gained attention as potential bypass routes. However, while they provide a partial release valve, they fall far short of replacing the strait’s capacity or eliminating its strategic vulnerability.
Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline (Petroline)
Saudi Arabia’s primary bypass is the East-West Pipeline, also known as Petroline. This approximately 1,200 km (750-mile) system connects the massive Abqaiq processing complex on the Persian Gulf coast to the Red Sea export terminal at Yanbu. Built in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War as a strategic contingency, it features twin lines with a base capacity of around 5 mb/d. Expansions, including conversions of parallel natural gas liquids lines tested after the 2019 Abqaiq attacks, have raised its surge capacity to about 7 mb/d.
In March 2026, Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser confirmed the pipeline was being ramped to full capacity within days, with Yanbu exports surging significantly — reaching averages of 3–4+ mb/d in early reports, a sharp increase from pre-crisis levels of around 1.7–2.8 mb/d. This route has allowed Saudi Arabia to redirect substantial volumes of Arab Light and other crudes away from the Gulf.
Key limitations: While the pipeline itself can handle up to 7 mb/d, the Yanbu terminals face practical bottlenecks. Nominal loading capacity is around 4.5 mb/d, but effective wartime throughput is often estimated closer to 3–4 mb/d due to tidal windows, tanker queuing, and operational constraints. Oil rerouted via Yanbu must then navigate the Red Sea, which introduces new risks such as potential disruptions at the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah Pipeline (ADCOP)
The United Arab Emirates relies on the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP), or Habshan–Fujairah pipeline. This 360–380 km line runs from onshore fields in Habshan to the Fujairah export terminal on the Gulf of Oman, completely bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. It has a nameplate capacity of 1.5 mb/d, with potential to reach 1.8 mb/d under optimized conditions.
The pipeline has seen increased utilization amid the crisis, helping ADNOC maintain exports from Fujairah. It accounts for a significant portion of UAE crude shipments that avoid the strait, with spare capacity estimates in the hundreds of thousands of barrels per day depending on current flows.
Challenges: Fujairah has faced reported attacks and security incidents, raising concerns about its reliability. Like Saudi’s route, it primarily serves national production, with limited flexibility for third-party volumes at scale.
Iraq’s Northern Pipeline to Ceyhan (Turkey)
Iraq, which normally exports the bulk of its 3+ mb/d production via southern terminals through Hormuz (mainly from Basra), has far more limited options. Efforts have focused on restarting and utilizing northern pipelines to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
In March 2026, following agreements between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government, flows resumed via the Kirkuk–Ceyhan route at an initial rate of around 250,000 barrels per day (0.25 mb/d). Historical capacity of the broader Iraq-Turkey pipeline system once reached higher levels (up to 1–1.5 mb/d), but current restarts are constrained by repairs, testing, and political/technical hurdles.
Additional proposals, such as pipeline extensions or revamps to bypass certain segments, aim to increase volumes over time, but progress remains gradual. Other ideas like trucking or undeveloped southern alternatives offer even smaller relief.
Constraints: This route represents only a fraction of Iraq’s output, and full scaling requires significant infrastructure work amid ongoing disputes and maintenance needs. Iraq has curtailed overall production sharply due to the Hormuz issues.
Overall Impact and Realistic Capacity
Optimistic combined bypass potential from these routes reaches roughly 7–9 mb/d at stretch (Saudi up to 7, UAE up to 1.8, Iraq starting at 0.25 and potentially higher). However, real-world factors — including terminal bottlenecks at Yanbu, security risks (e.g., attacks on Fujairah), logistical challenges in rerouting, and untested sustained flows at maximum levels — reduce effective capacity. Analyses suggest realistic totals often fall in the 2.6–5.5 mb/d range, covering only 13–28% of normal Hormuz volumes.
These pipelines were designed primarily for national contingencies or short-term disruptions, not a prolonged, large-scale closure affecting 17–20+ mb/d across multiple producers (including Kuwait, Qatar, and others with no comparable bypasses). Additional vulnerabilities persist: Red Sea routes face their own chokepoints, and much of the infrastructure remains within range of potential attacks.
In summary, the Saudi, UAE, and Iraqi pipelines serve as a valuable partial mitigation and demonstrate decades of prudent planning. They have helped cushion the immediate shock by allowing key producers to maintain meaningful exports and stabilize markets to some degree. Yet they cannot fully “escape” reliance on the Strait of Hormuz or prevent significant global supply shortfalls, price volatility, and economic ripple effects. Longer-term diversification — through new infrastructure, strategic reserves, or reduced dependence on Gulf exports — remains essential for true energy resilience.
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