Why the US Hasn’t Used Force to Fully Secure the Strait of Hormuz

As of late March 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains a flashpoint in the ongoing US-Israel conflict with Iran. Iran has severely disrupted shipping through the narrow waterway—vital for roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply—by threatening and occasionally attacking vessels linked to the US or Israel. In response, the US military has conducted extensive strikes, destroying much of Iran’s naval capacity and coastal infrastructure. Yet a full-scale operation to secure the strait by force has not materialized. This restraint stems from a deliberate, phased military strategy rather than any lack of capability.

The Current Situation

The war escalated on February 28, 2026, with joint US-Israeli strikes on Iranian targets. Iran retaliated by effectively closing or heavily restricting the Strait of Hormuz to most Western-affiliated shipping, using drones, missiles, mines, and fast-attack boats. This has triggered significant disruptions to global energy markets and higher fuel prices, though limited traffic—sometimes described as a “de facto toll” system—continues for select vessels.

US forces, under Central Command, report hitting over 10,000 targets, eliminating around 92% of Iran’s larger naval vessels and substantial portions of its missile, drone, and naval production facilities. President Trump has issued ultimatums, extended deadlines for Iran to reopen the strait, and called on allies (including NATO) to assist with escorts. Some tankers have been allowed through as gestures amid talks, but diplomacy appears strained, with both sides hardening positions. Additional US troops, including Marines from the USS Tripoli and elements of the 82nd Airborne, are deploying to the region.

A Two-Phase Strategy

The US approach follows two phases:

  • Phase 1 (Ongoing): Systematic degradation of Iran’s ability to threaten shipping. This involves airstrikes on radars, command centers, drone and missile stockpiles, coastal weapons, and mine-laying capabilities. The goal is to reduce the volume and effectiveness of attacks before committing assets to direct protection of commercial vessels.
  • Phase 2: Once threats are sufficiently neutralized, shift to active escorts, patrols, mine-clearing operations, and sustained surveillance to ensure safe passage.

This sequenced method prioritizes long-term degradation of Iranian military power over an immediate, resource-intensive push to reopen the strait.

Four Key Reasons for Restraint

Naval and strategic analysts point to several interconnected challenges that make a rushed “secure by force” operation costly and risky:

  1. Diversion from Higher-Priority Objectives
    The primary focus remains destroying Iran’s ballistic missile programs, nuclear-related facilities, and broader military infrastructure, along with disrupting proxy networks. Redirecting aircraft, intelligence assets, and strike platforms to the strait could undermine these core goals.
  2. The Land Threat Dominates
    The strait is only about 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, with tight shipping lanes. Iran controls the northern coastline, from which most threats—shore-based missiles, drones launched from trucks, and small boats—originate. Securing the water alone is insufficient; neutralizing land-based capabilities would likely require risky coastal raids or ground operations by Marines or other forces in terrain well-suited to asymmetric defense.
  3. Massive Resource Demands
    Effective protection would necessitate heavy escorts—potentially one or two warships per commercial tanker or large convoys—tying up a significant portion of available US naval forces in the region. Mine-clearing, if needed, could take weeks and involve specialized assets. Without robust allied contributions (many nations have been hesitant), this could stretch US capabilities thin.
  4. High Risks in an Asymmetric Environment
    Iran’s toolkit of relatively cheap weapons (drones, uncrewed surface vessels, anti-ship missiles) can saturate defenses in a confined chokepoint. US warships carry hundreds of crew members, and commanders are cautious about exposing them to swarming attacks where geography favors the defender. A single successful hit could inflict disproportionate costs.

Broader Considerations

Full-scale securing operations also carry risks of regional escalation and would demand sustained presence, raising questions about long-term commitments and international legal norms regarding territorial waters. Historical precedents, such as the 1980s Tanker War, show the US has conducted limited actions (e.g., Operation Praying Mantis) against Iranian threats, but never a permanent occupation-style control.

The situation remains fluid. Trump has floated options like seizing key sites such as Kharg Island, while emphasizing allied burden-sharing. Ongoing strikes continue to weaken Iranian capabilities, and diplomatic efforts—centered on ceasefire proposals addressing nuclear and missile issues—persist amid conflicting signals from Tehran.

In essence, the US possesses the military power to challenge Iran’s disruption of the Strait of Hormuz more aggressively. However, current restraint reflects a calculated preference for a degradation-first strategy that minimizes risks to US forces and assets while pursuing wider war aims. Whether this leads to escalated naval action, successful diplomacy, or further Iranian concessions will depend on developments in the coming weeks. The strait’s vulnerability highlights the enduring challenges of asymmetric warfare in critical maritime chokepoints.

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