In a provocative guest essay published in The New York Times on April 6, 2026, University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape argues that the ongoing U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran—known as Operation Epic Fury—has unexpectedly elevated Tehran to the status of a “fourth center of global power,” alongside the United States, China, and Russia.
Pape contends that Iran’s power does not stem from conventional economic or military might, which have both suffered significant setbacks in the conflict that began on February 28, 2026. Instead, it derives from Tehran’s demonstrated capacity to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow chokepoint through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil trade flows. By mining the strait, launching missiles and drones at Gulf energy infrastructure, and creating persistent uncertainty in global energy markets, Iran has weaponized its geography in a way that forces the world to reckon with its leverage.
Oil prices have surged above $100 per barrel amid the disruptions, prompting warnings from the International Energy Agency about threats to the global economy potentially rivaling or exceeding the shocks of the 1970s. Pape suggests that if this control persists for months or even years, it could reshape international relations, erode U.S. influence, and create opportunities for adversaries like China and Russia. In this view, Iran’s asymmetric strategy—using mines, missiles, and remaining proxy networks—transforms a conventionally weaker actor into a pivotal player capable of holding global energy security hostage.
The Realities on the Ground
While the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz has indeed imposed real economic costs—higher fuel prices, inflationary pressures, and diverted U.S. military resources—the broader trajectory of the war paints a more complex and less triumphant picture for Iran.
U.S. and Israeli strikes have systematically degraded key elements of Iran’s military capabilities. Reports indicate significant damage to missile and drone production facilities (with some estimates suggesting over two-thirds affected), the sinking or neutralization of much of Iran’s surface navy, and setbacks to its nuclear program. Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” proxy network—encompassing groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias—has faced further attrition following earlier losses in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. Leadership changes, including the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the subsequent election of his son Mojtaba, have introduced internal uncertainties, alongside reported fractures between the regular army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), supply shortages, and civilian displacement on a large scale.
Economically, Iran entered the conflict already strained by years of sanctions, high inflation, currency devaluation, and domestic unrest. The war has compounded these pressures through lost oil revenues, damaged infrastructure, and deepened isolation. Long-term recovery as a “major power” would likely require sanctions relief and foreign investment—prospects that remain distant without substantial concessions on Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and regional proxies. U.S. proposals have reportedly included a 15-point framework demanding nuclear dismantlement and guaranteed freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Regionally, Iran’s actions have risked alienating Gulf states targeted by its retaliatory strikes and further isolating Tehran diplomatically. While Russia benefits from elevated oil prices and China gains from U.S. distraction in the Middle East, Iran itself faces the burdens of overextension and the challenge of sustaining asymmetric operations against a superior conventional adversary.
A Temporary Lever, Not Enduring Power
History offers cautionary lessons about energy chokepoint leverage. Disruptions can deliver short-term shocks and force policy adjustments, but nations and markets adapt. Alternative routes, increased production elsewhere, naval coalitions to clear sea lanes, and targeted military responses have neutralized similar threats in the past, as seen with Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Iran’s ability to mine or harass shipping in Hormuz is potent but brittle; it invites escalation and does not equate to the sustained global influence exercised by true great powers through economic scale, technological innovation, industrial capacity, or reliable alliances.
Pape’s essay rightly draws attention to a critical vulnerability in the global energy system and the high costs of escalation in the Middle East. Prolonged uncertainty over Hormuz carries genuine risks for the world economy and could complicate U.S. strategic priorities elsewhere, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Yet framing these developments as Iran’s ascent to “major world power” status risks overstating its gains relative to its mounting deficits in hard power, economic resilience, and regional standing.
As the conflict enters its second month, with ongoing strikes, missile exchanges, and diplomatic maneuvering, outcomes remain highly fluid. Ceasefire talks, further military escalation, internal Iranian dynamics, or shifts in energy markets could rapidly alter the balance. Geopolitics in such conflicts seldom yields unambiguous victors. The core objectives—neutralizing nuclear risks, curbing proxy warfare, and ensuring freedom of navigation—continue to drive U.S. and Israeli policy, even as the side effects of disruption test global patience.
Iran has shown notable resilience and a willingness to defy superior forces, qualities that should not be underestimated. However, turning tactical disruption into strategic elevation requires survival, reconstitution, and diplomatic breakthroughs that current trends—military degradation, economic pain, and weakened networks—do not yet convincingly support. The war tests the Iranian regime as much as it challenges the international order; whether it emerges strengthened or further diminished will depend on how the coming weeks and months unfold.
About The Author
