Russia has built a systematic program to recruit teenagers in occupied parts of Ukraine into a pro-Moscow propaganda apparatus. Operating primarily through the state-backed Yunarmia (“Young Army”) youth movement and its specialized “Young Correspondents” (Yunkor) initiative, the effort targets children and adolescents in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. The program combines militarized patriotic education, journalism training, incentives, and immersive experiences to transform local youth into active promoters of the Russian invasion—framed officially as the “special military operation.”
Recruitment Through Schools and Youth Organizations
Entry into the system often begins in schools and local Yunarmia detachments. Russian authorities have established branches of Yunarmia across occupied territories, with an estimated 5,500 Ukrainian children participating overall. Recruiters visit schools, organize initiation ceremonies—frequently timed to coincide with Russian patriotic holidays such as Defender of the Fatherland Day on February 23—and offer uniforms, drills, and free activities. Teenagers swear oaths of allegiance and join for social recognition, awards, or limited opportunities in an environment where alternatives are scarce.
The propaganda track centers on the Yunkor program. Participants, around 140 documented active members in occupied areas in 2023–2024, undergo structured training that teaches them to produce content glorifying Russian forces, denouncing Ukraine, and reinforcing Kremlin narratives.
Training and Content Creation Pipeline
Young Correspondents follow online courses featuring more than 26 lectures on journalism, social media management, and “information security.” Instructors, often aligned with Kremlin viewpoints, emphasize creating “patriotic” material that supports the war effort. Training covers interview techniques with soldiers, report production, and strategies for succeeding in what is described as an “information war.” Tests reinforce the mandatory use of Russian terminology and historical analogies, such as equating Ukraine with Nazi Germany.
Selected teenagers are invited on trips to Russia for advanced immersion. Groups travel by train from occupied regions, often via Rostov-on-Don, to attend national forums in Moscow and other cities. These events include lectures from soldiers, state media professionals, and veterans, alongside sessions on social media engineering and new media production. In one documented case from July–August 2023, about 18 youths from occupied territories participated in such a forum.
Participants then produce videos, articles, social media posts, and reports for Yunarmia channels, occupation-controlled media outlets like Yunarmia Pravda in Kherson, and local Telegram groups. Content typically features interviews with Russian soldiers, stories of “war heroes,” and celebrations of Soviet military history. Rewards include cash grants (one program offered up to 800,000 rubles, roughly $10,500), diplomas from the Russian Union of Journalists, leadership positions, and public recognition such as murals featuring the young contributors. In 2024 alone, the Yunkor program in occupied areas received approximately 9 million rubles in funding.
Real Cases of Recruited Teenagers
Several documented examples illustrate the program’s impact. In Henichesk, Kherson region, a girl named Kateryna shifted from making videos praising the Ukrainian language before occupation to producing 44 pro-Russian videos after joining Yunarmia. She interviewed soldiers, promoted “unification” with Russia, rose to a deputy regional leadership role, and secured major grants.
In the same region, Marina led a Yunarmia detachment as a teenager, contributed articles to Yunarmia Pravda about war heroes and military games, and posted content with strong anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. In Luhansk, teenagers Polina Zasevskaya and Yelisey Kharchenko created films and recitals that drew parallels between current events and Soviet-era “heroism,” often incorporating footage from the battlefield.
Broader Russification and Militarization Strategy
The youth propaganda effort forms part of a larger campaign to reshape identity in occupied territories. Russian curricula have replaced Ukrainian history and language studies, while mandatory “Conversations About the Essentials” deliver patriotic lessons. Cadet classes, youth clubs, and seemingly benign environmental projects serve as gateways to deeper ideological exposure. Similar influencer-style training camps in Russia, including events in 2026 involving military-style uniforms and instruction in video production and AI, sometimes include participants from occupied areas.
Ukrainian human rights groups and international observers view these activities as a form of systematic identity erasure and ideological coercion. They raise concerns under international law regarding an occupying power’s responsibilities toward children, particularly the prohibition on forced ideological enlistment or militarization of minors.
Long-Term Implications
This recruitment model reflects Russia’s strategy for consolidating control over occupied Ukraine by cultivating a generation of local voices who amplify Moscow’s narrative. While participation levels and individual motivations vary—shaped by family pressures, limited access to outside information, and the hyper-militarized daily environment—the program continues to expand with state funding in the hundreds of millions of rubles for Yunarmia overall.
Investigations by Ukrainian journalists, including a detailed April 2026 report drawing on internal documents, social media evidence, and participant records, have exposed the inner workings of this machinery. The initiative highlights the intersection of education, youth movements, and information warfare in Russia’s approach to occupied territories.
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