Arab nations, especially Egypt and Jordan, have firmly rejected large-scale resettlement of refugees from Gaza, describing any mass influx as a “red line.” This policy has remained consistent even amid the intense humanitarian crisis following the escalation of hostilities in October 2023. While Arab governments publicly express solidarity with the Palestinian cause, their decisions are driven by deep strategic, security, demographic, and political considerations.
Fear of Permanent Displacement
A central concern is that accepting Gaza refugees would amount to endorsing what many Arab leaders call the “ethnic cleansing” of Palestinian territories. They argue that allowing residents to leave Gaza permanently would enable Israel to depopulate the area without permitting returns, effectively erasing Palestinian territorial claims to Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Historical experiences from the 1948 and 1967 wars reinforce this view: many displaced Palestinians ended up in long-term exile in neighboring countries. Egypt and other states insist that Palestinians must remain in place to preserve the viability of a future Palestinian state.
Security and Stability Risks
Egypt faces particularly acute security worries. Officials fear that Hamas militants or other armed groups could exploit a refugee flow to establish bases in the Sinai Peninsula, potentially launching attacks on Israel and endangering the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Sinai already contends with Islamist insurgencies, and an uncontrolled influx could exacerbate instability. As a result, Egypt has heavily fortified its border at Rafah and focused on delivering aid into Gaza rather than opening it for resettlement.
Jordan, which already hosts a substantial population of Palestinian origin (estimated at around half the country), shares similar anxieties. The kingdom still remembers the 1970 Black September crisis, when Palestinian fedayeen groups challenged the monarchy, triggering a bloody civil conflict. King Abdullah II has repeatedly stated that further refugee waves could destabilize the country demographically and politically.
Lebanon’s experience adds another cautionary tale. The presence of Palestinian armed factions contributed significantly to the outbreak and prolongation of the 1975–1990 Lebanese Civil War. To this day, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon face severe restrictions on rights and citizenship precisely to discourage permanent settlement and maintain pressure for their “right of return.”
Economic and Domestic Pressures
Many Arab states are already stretched thin by previous refugee crises. Egypt manages millions of displaced people from Sudan, Syria, and elsewhere while grappling with its own severe economic challenges. Jordan and Lebanon similarly struggle under the weight of earlier inflows. Absorbing over two million people from Gaza—many of whom have lived under Hamas rule—would place enormous strain on resources, infrastructure, and social cohesion.
Authoritarian regimes also worry that large numbers of refugees could fuel domestic unrest, with pro-Palestinian sentiment spilling over into protests against their own governments. Even wealthy Gulf states, despite rhetorical support, have shown little interest in permanent resettlement programs.
Political Calculations
The refugee issue remains a potent tool in the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. Resettling Palestinians elsewhere would weaken the longstanding demand for their return to historic lands. This explains why even Hamas supporters such as Qatar and Turkey have declined to take in refugees on any meaningful scale. Meanwhile, countries that have pursued normalization with Israel through the Abraham Accords see the Palestinian issue as one best managed at a distance rather than through absorption.
The Unique Status of Palestinian Refugees
Unlike most global refugee situations handled by the UNHCR, Palestinian refugees fall under the mandate of UNRWA, which preserves refugee status across generations. Arab host countries have historically opposed naturalization to keep the “right of return” politically alive. This approach has resulted in generations living in camps with limited rights in places like Lebanon and Jordan, contrasting sharply with standard international practices of integration and resettlement.
In summary, Arab governments’ refusal to open their borders to Gaza refugees reflects cold realpolitik rather than mere indifference. Security threats, fears of repeating past instability, economic burdens, and the strategic value of maintaining the Palestinian cause all converge to shape this hardline stance. While aid convoys and calls for ceasefires continue, no major Arab state has offered large-scale or permanent refuge—prioritizing regional stability and long-term political objectives over immediate humanitarian relocation.
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