In the vast tapestry of Asian geopolitics, few relationships are as layered and consequential as that between India and China. Home to nearly 2.8 billion people combined, these two ancient civilizations share Himalayan borders, civilizational exchanges dating back millennia, and today, a complex mix of economic interdependence and strategic competition. Yet, a recent analysis in The Diplomat highlights a striking asymmetry: while India remains acutely aware of China as a strategic challenger, many ordinary Chinese exhibit indifference—or even quiet contempt—toward India. This is not primarily driven by the scars of the 1962 war or recurring border skirmishes along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), but by deeper historical narratives about modernization, colonialism, and national rejuvenation.
To understand this dynamic, one must travel back in time. Over 1,600 years ago, the Chinese Buddhist monk Faxian journeyed to India during the Gupta Empire. He painted a picture of a prosperous, harmonious society: “The inhabitants are prosperous and happy… The King in the administration of justice inflicts no corporal punishment; but each culprit is fined in money according to the gravity of his offence.” India was a holy land, a fountainhead of Buddhism and philosophical wisdom that profoundly influenced China.
By the late Tang dynasty around 907 CE, however, Buddhism had been integrated into Chinese culture, and Confucianism resurged, bolstering China’s self-perception as the Middle Kingdom. Interactions evolved from spiritual pilgrimages to commercial ties. When Admiral Zheng He sailed to southern India in the early 15th century during the Ming dynasty, he encountered local kingdoms largely through the lens of tributary relations, reflecting China’s hierarchical worldview.
The pivotal shift occurred during the era of Western imperialism. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Chinese visitors and intellectuals observed British-ruled India as a cautionary tale. Political thinker Kang Youwei remarked that India, once a celebrated Asian nation, had preserved its traditions without adaptation. This allowed a British East India Company—with modest capital—to subjugate vast territories during the Qianlong era. For many Chinese, India’s fate underscored a critical lesson: nations must modernize aggressively, adopt scientific methods, and outcompete the West to avoid subjugation.
China internalized this imperative. The May Fourth Movement of 1919 saw intellectuals challenge Confucian traditions seen as impediments to progress. This ethos carried through the 20th century, including the tumultuous Cultural Revolution, and into Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, culminating in China’s meteoric economic rise. In contrast, many Chinese narratives suggest India did not fully break from its past in the same decisive manner, leading to perceptions of persistent backwardness, superstition, and chaos.
This mindset is vividly illustrated in popular Chinese culture. Liu Cixin’s globally acclaimed sci-fi novel The Three-Body Problem—a cornerstone of Sinofuturism—imagines humanity confronting an alien threat through cooperation among major powers: China, the US, Russia, Europe, and Japan. India, despite its real-world feats like becoming the first nation to land near the Moon’s south pole with Chandrayaan-3, barely features. This omission speaks volumes about how India registers (or fails to register) in China’s forward-looking imagination.
Today, stereotypes flourish on Chinese platforms like Zhihu. Discussions often portray India as unable to rival China due to its democratic “chaos,” diverse linguistic and religious landscape, and slower manufacturing-led transformation. While the Chinese state pragmatically recognizes India as a regional rival—particularly in the Indo-Pacific, where New Delhi’s deepening Quad ties with the US, Japan, and Australia challenge Beijing’s vision of a Sino-centric Asia—public sentiment leans toward indifference rather than obsession.
Professor Wenjuan Zhang has highlighted a key philosophical divergence: Chinese political legitimacy often leans outcome-based, measured by tangible results in infrastructure, technology, and GDP growth. Indian legitimacy, by contrast, tends to emphasize procedural fairness, democratic processes, and pluralism. China’s focus on matching or surpassing the United States as a peer superpower drives a results-oriented national ethos. India’s strengths in IT services, pharmaceuticals, space, and a youthful demographic are acknowledged in policy circles but often overshadowed in popular discourse by narratives of underperformance relative to China’s manufacturing juggernaut.
Geopolitically, the relationship remains tense yet economically vital. Bilateral trade hit record highs around $155 billion in recent years, with India running a massive deficit—exceeding $100 billion—making it a crucial market for Chinese exports amid Western tariffs and slowing global demand. India relies on Chinese components for electronics, APIs for pharmaceuticals, and machinery, while pushing “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India) to reduce dependence.
Border issues persist. The deadly 2020 Galwan clash and subsequent military buildups have not fully resolved, despite partial disengagements and diplomatic thaws in 2025-2026. China continues infrastructure development in disputed areas and maintains close ties with Pakistan, while India strengthens defenses, diversifies partnerships, and invests in border infrastructure. Beijing prefers separating economic cooperation from territorial disputes; New Delhi insists on border stability as a prerequisite for normal ties.
Despite these frictions, both sides recognize mutual necessities. Recent moves include easing some investment curbs, resuming border trade discussions, and engaging in multilateral forums like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. For China, facing domestic economic headwinds and US competition, stable relations with India help secure markets and reduce pressure on multiple fronts. For India, selective engagement can accelerate technology transfer, infrastructure, and manufacturing goals without compromising strategic autonomy.
However, underlying asymmetries remain. China views itself as a global power with a unipolar vision for Asia, where India is not granted peer status. India seeks a multipolar order with itself as a pole. This status gap fuels mistrust, compounded by China’s “string of pearls” strategy encircling India via ports and influence in neighboring countries.
Critics argue China’s indifference is myopic. India boasts a thriving startup ecosystem, booming space sector, defense innovations, and democratic soft power that resonates across the Global South. Its demographic dividend— with a younger population—contrasts sharply with China’s aging society and demographic challenges. In high-tech areas like semiconductors and renewable energy, India is making strides that could reshape supply chains. Dismissing these risks underestimating a future where India plays a larger role in balancing Asia.
For Indians, this perceptual gap offers lessons too. While vigilance on security is essential, showcasing achievements in governance, innovation, and cultural resilience can reshape global narratives. Accelerating reforms in ease of doing business, infrastructure, and skill development will make India’s rise undeniable. Domestic political stability and inclusive growth are key to projecting strength abroad.
In an era of great power competition, neither country can afford complete disengagement. Trade, climate cooperation, and global governance issues demand pragmatic collaboration. Yet, true détente requires addressing the trust deficit—resolving border ambiguities, balancing trade, and fostering people-to-people ties beyond elite diplomacy.
Ultimately, China’s relative lack of interest in India reflects its own triumphant narrative of national rejuvenation against historical humiliation. India, having charted a different democratic path, continues to prove its resilience. As both navigate the 21st century, mutual respect for each other’s distinct models—rather than indifference or rivalry—could unlock greater stability and prosperity for Asia and the world. The dragon and the elephant need not dance in perfect harmony, but ignoring one another’s steps entirely serves neither well.
About The Author
