India has every reason to view China’s deepening involvement in Bangladesh’s Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP) with serious concern. What appears on the surface as a technical river management initiative carries profound strategic, security, and geopolitical implications for New Delhi, particularly given its location near one of India’s most vulnerable chokepoints.

The recent pledge of Chinese support during Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s June 2026 visit to Beijing has accelerated a project that had long been stalled. Beijing has committed to providing assistance “within its capacity,” expediting a joint technical feasibility study, and framing the cooperation as free from “third-party influence.” This development comes at a time when India-Bangladesh relations are already navigating a delicate phase following political changes in Dhaka.

The Teesta River and the Long-Standing Water Dispute

The Teesta River originates in the Himalayas in Sikkim, flows through West Bengal, and enters Bangladesh, where it supports agriculture, fisheries, irrigation, and drinking water for millions in the northern districts, especially around Rangpur. Seasonal extremes — devastating floods during the monsoon and acute water shortages in winter — have made effective river management a priority for Dhaka.

For over 15 years, India and Bangladesh have struggled to finalize a water-sharing treaty. A draft agreement in 2011 collapsed due to opposition from West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, who argued that any sharing formula would harm the state’s irrigation needs. Since then, the issue has remained a persistent irritant in bilateral ties, with Bangladesh repeatedly pressing for a fair share while India cites technical and political constraints.

Into this vacuum has stepped China. As early as 2016, Bangladesh’s Water Development Board signed an MoU with China’s PowerChina for a technical study on dredging and managing the river. That effort was largely put on hold amid Indian diplomatic pushback. Now, under the current government in Dhaka, the project has been revived with renewed Chinese backing.

What the Teesta Project Entails

The TRCMRP is an ambitious, multi-billion-dollar undertaking aimed at fundamentally altering the river’s regime inside Bangladesh. Key components include:

• Dredging approximately 140 million cubic meters of sediment
• Reclaiming around 171 square kilometers of land
• Constructing and repairing extensive embankments
• Building jetties, roads, and supporting infrastructure

The stated goals are flood control, erosion prevention, improved irrigation, land reclamation for agriculture and urban development, and turning the river into an economic artery for northern Bangladesh. While these objectives address genuine developmental needs, the scale and the involvement of a Chinese state-owned enterprise with close ties to Beijing’s strategic apparatus raise red flags far beyond hydrology.

The Critical Proximity to the Siliguri Corridor

The most immediate and alarming aspect for India is geography. The Teesta basin in northern Bangladesh lies just 10-20 kilometers from the international border and uncomfortably close to the Siliguri Corridor — the narrow “Chicken’s Neck” strip of land (roughly 20-22 km wide at its narrowest) that connects mainland India to the eight northeastern states.

All major road, rail, and pipeline links to the Northeast pass through this corridor. Any significant Chinese engineering presence, infrastructure development, or long-term operational footprint in the adjacent Bangladeshi territory could provide Beijing with enhanced surveillance capabilities, potential dual-use logistics options, or leverage in a future contingency. Indian security establishments have historically viewed any external power’s deep involvement in this sensitive zone with extreme caution.

China’s involvement is not limited to the river project alone. Beijing has steadily expanded its economic and infrastructural footprint in northern Bangladesh through roads, bridges, power plants, and industrial zones. The revival of discussions around older projects, including a World War II-era air base in Lalmonirhat near the border, adds another layer of concern.

Broader Geopolitical and Strategic Ramifications

China’s move fits into its wider playbook across South Asia: using economic and infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to gain influence, create dependencies, and establish strategic footholds. Similar patterns have been observed in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, Pakistan’s Gwadar, and various projects in Nepal and the Maldives.

For Bangladesh, turning to China offers a pragmatic way to address urgent water and development challenges that bilateral talks with India have failed to resolve for years. However, it also risks increasing Dhaka’s economic and political leverage toward Beijing at the expense of traditional closeness with New Delhi.

The timing is particularly sensitive. Political transitions in Bangladesh have opened space for greater Chinese engagement. At the same time, Pakistan has shown renewed interest in deepening military and economic ties with Dhaka, including offers of fighter jets and proposals for joint mechanisms. This combination of Chinese infrastructure presence and Pakistani overtures near India’s sensitive eastern flank creates a concerning regional dynamic.

Water Politics and Potential Leverage

Beyond physical infrastructure, control or significant influence over river management projects can translate into hydropolitical leverage. While the current project focuses on Bangladesh’s side of the border, large-scale interventions in dredging, embankments, and flow regulation could affect downstream or upstream dynamics in ways that concern Indian planners.

China has itself built extensive dam and diversion infrastructure on rivers originating in its territory that flow into South and Southeast Asia. Its public statements emphasizing that bilateral cooperation “does not target any third party” ring somewhat hollow given its own sensitivity to external involvement in its shared river systems, such as the Mekong.

For India, the risk is not just immediate security but a gradual erosion of influence over transboundary water issues with Bangladesh. With 54 rivers shared between the two countries, precedents set on the Teesta could affect future negotiations on other basins.

India’s Response and the Way Forward

India has not remained passive. In 2024, it offered substantial financial and technical assistance — reportedly around $1 billion — for Teesta management to keep Chinese involvement at bay. New Delhi continues to monitor developments closely and has stated it will factor all related developments into its approach while taking “appropriate measures.”

Possible Indian responses include:

• Renewed diplomatic efforts to revive water-sharing talks with fresh incentives for Bangladesh
• Accelerated infrastructure and connectivity projects in the Northeast to reduce vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor
• Strengthened security cooperation and intelligence sharing with Dhaka on border and extremist threats
• Offering alternative technical and financial packages for river management that address Bangladesh’s core concerns more effectively

Success will depend on demonstrating that partnership with India delivers tangible, timely benefits on water security and economic development without the strategic baggage that comes with heavy Chinese involvement.

China’s support for the Teesta project is not merely about helping Bangladesh manage a river. It represents a calculated strategic move that places Beijing’s engineering and economic footprint in close proximity to one of India’s most critical and vulnerable corridors. Combined with shifting political winds in Dhaka and broader regional realignments, it demands serious attention from Indian policymakers.

The alarm is not about opposing Bangladesh’s right to develop its water resources. It stems from the recognition that in geopolitics, infrastructure is rarely just infrastructure — especially when it is built by a rival power right next to your strategic jugular. India must respond with a combination of vigilance, proactive diplomacy, and credible alternatives if it hopes to safeguard its core interests in the region while maintaining a constructive relationship with its eastern neighbor.

About The Author