In recent months, a coordinated nationwide crackdown on one of China’s largest unregistered Protestant networks has underscored a broader, intensifying campaign by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to bring all expressions of Christianity under state control. The October 2025 arrests of nearly 30 pastors and members from Beijing’s Zion Church—followed by formal charges against 18 leaders—marked one of the largest operations against an underground church network in decades. While founding pastor Ezra Jin Mingri was released after 266 days in detention in July 2026, eight others remain imprisoned. Similar raids have targeted other prominent house churches, including Early Rain Covenant Church and communities in Wenzhou. These actions are not isolated incidents but part of a systematic effort under President Xi Jinping to enforce “Sinicization” of religion.
The CCP, officially atheist, has long regulated religious life. Since Xi consolidated power, however, the approach has grown more assertive. The core policy—Sinicization—requires religious groups to align their doctrines, practices, and loyalty with Chinese socialist values and CCP leadership. This means adapting teachings to emphasize patriotism, removing or downplaying “foreign” elements, and ensuring that faith serves national unity rather than challenging it. For Christianity, viewed partly as a Western import, this has translated into heightened surveillance, legal restrictions, church demolitions, and pressure on believers to register with state-approved bodies.
The Framework of Control
China officially recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism. Protestants must affiliate with the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), while Catholics fall under the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association. These state-supervised organizations allow worship within approved venues, provided leaders and congregations demonstrate loyalty to the Party and socialist ideology. Registered churches can operate with varying degrees of autonomy depending on local enforcement, but they face expectations to incorporate CCP messaging and limit foreign influence.
The majority of China’s Christians—estimates range from roughly 44 million (official figures: about 38 million Protestants and 6 million Catholics) to 70–100 million or more according to independent sources—worship in unregistered “house churches.” These groups operate in homes, offices, or temporary spaces without government approval. While many smaller gatherings fly under the radar, larger or more visible ones attract scrutiny. Authorities argue that registration ensures “normal religious activities” and prevents extremism or foreign interference. In practice, it grants the state veto power over leadership, content, and expansion.
Since the late 2010s, regulations have tightened significantly. The 2018 Religious Affairs Regulations expanded oversight of venues, clergy, and online activities. New rules emphasize that religious organizations must support CCP leadership and socialist values. Training programs for clergy now include sessions on “strict governance of religion.” Local governments have demolished or altered churches—removing crosses, covering buildings with tarps, or razing structures entirely, as seen in recent cases in southern China. Surveillance has become pervasive, with digital monitoring of gatherings, communications, and even financial transactions like offerings.
The Digital Frontline
A September 2025 “Code of Conduct for Religious Clergy on the Internet” represents a major escalation in online control. The 18-article rules apply to clergy of all recognized religions and strictly limit what religious leaders can do digitally. Livestreamed sermons, religious discussions in chat groups, short-video preaching, fundraising for worship sites, and the use of AI for religious content are largely prohibited unless conducted on government-approved platforms. Clergy are barred from targeting minors online, organizing youth activities digitally, or engaging in anything deemed “foreign infiltration.”
These restrictions aim to prevent independent religious expression from spreading beyond physical venues. They isolate clergy from global discourse and place sacred speech under state censors. Spontaneous online outreach or community-building—once a lifeline for house churches during periods of physical restriction—has become far riskier. The rules reflect the CCP’s view that any religious activity outside direct oversight threatens social harmony and ideological unity.
High-Profile Cases Reveal the Pattern
The Zion Church crackdown illustrates the risks for prominent unregistered groups. In October 2025, authorities conducted raids across multiple cities, detaining pastors and staff on suspicions of “illegally using information networks.” Charges later shifted toward “illegal business operations” and “fraud” for some leaders. The church, known for its size and influence, had moved activities online after earlier pressures. Lawyers defending the detained faced threats, adding another layer of intimidation.
Other cases followed a similar script. In late 2025 and early 2026, authorities raided Early Rain Covenant Church in Sichuan, detaining leaders and interrogating members. In Wenzhou, the Yayang Church community faced mass arrests in December 2025 after refusing to display the national flag; the church building was later demolished. Reports document thousands of Christians investigated or detained for house church activities in recent years, with some sentenced to prison terms ranging from months to over a decade on charges including fraud or cult-related offenses. Certain groups, such as the Church of Almighty God, are classified as illegal cults (xie jiao), carrying severe penalties.
These operations send a clear message: independent organization and growth will not be tolerated indefinitely. Even after releases or reduced sentences in some cases, the pattern of raids, detentions, and property seizures continues.
Life for Believers and the Broader Picture
For ordinary Christians, daily life involves navigating uncertainty. Registered church members generally face lower risk if they comply with rules, though prominent voices challenging policies can still encounter trouble. House church participants often worship in small, discreet groups, rotating locations and avoiding public advertising. Many report pressure to join state churches, surveillance of their activities, or difficulties for children attending services. Bans on minors participating in religious education have been reinforced, aiming to limit faith transmission to younger generations.
Despite restrictions, Christianity has shown remarkable resilience in China. Growth was rapid in the reform era after the Cultural Revolution’s devastation, fueled by personal faith, community support, and perceived moral clarity amid rapid social change. Recent data suggest the share of adults identifying as Christian has stabilized rather than continuing explosive expansion, yet the absolute numbers remain significant. Underground networks adapt through smaller cells, digital workarounds (where possible), and emphasis on personal conviction over institutional structures.
The CCP justifies its approach as necessary for national security, social stability, and cultural sovereignty. Officials argue that religions must “Sinicize”—integrate with Chinese traditions and socialist society—to avoid becoming tools of external influence. In registered settings, this can mean sermons emphasizing harmony with state goals or visual displays of loyalty. Critics, including international human rights organizations and religious freedom advocates, describe the measures as systematic suppression that violates freedom of belief and conscience.
Outlook
China’s tightening grip on Christianity reflects a wider CCP strategy of asserting ideological control across society. Under Xi, religion is expected to serve the Party rather than compete with it. While outright eradication is unlikely—given Christianity’s deep roots and the practical challenges of policing private belief—the space for independent practice continues to shrink. New digital rules, ongoing enforcement actions, and pressure on unregistered groups suggest the trend will persist.
For Chinese Christians, the choice often boils down to conformity within approved boundaries or quiet perseverance in the shadows. The faith’s future in the world’s most populous country will depend on how believers navigate these constraints and whether the Party’s assimilation campaign ultimately succeeds in reshaping Christianity in its own image—or whether personal conviction proves more enduring than state directives.
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