NATO’s Secret Plans to Defend Europe Without the US
As transatlantic tensions rise and the United States shifts its military focus toward the Indo-Pacific and other priorities, European NATO members are accelerating contingency planning to safeguard the continent with significantly reduced American support. These behind-the-scenes efforts, sometimes referred to as “Plan B,” “European NATO,” or a fallback strategy, aim to maintain deterrence against Russia even if Washington further scales back its conventional commitments. While NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has repeatedly warned that Europe cannot fully defend itself without the US—describing full independence as a “dream”—allies are taking concrete steps to build resilience within the alliance’s framework.
The urgency stems from tangible US policy changes under the Trump administration. In recent months, the Pentagon has announced reductions in forces and capabilities allocated to NATO’s Force Model, the alliance’s blueprint for rapid response in crises. These include withdrawing approximately 5,000 troops from Germany, canceling certain deployments such as a long-range fires battalion, and trimming contributions like an aircraft carrier strike group, cruise missile submarines, fighter jets (F-16 and F-15 numbers cut notably), aerial refueling tankers, and maritime patrol aircraft.
Such moves reflect a broader reorientation: the US seeks to avoid being the primary defender of Europe while expecting allies to shoulder more responsibility. Events like tensions over Greenland and differing views on conflicts in the Middle East have heightened European anxieties, prompting informal discussions at NATO headquarters and national capitals. Officials emphasize these plans are not about replacing NATO but ensuring operational continuity and deterrence through a “more European” alliance.
Core Elements of Europe’s Contingency Strategy
At the heart of these preparations is enhancing European roles in command-and-control structures. Planners are identifying how Europeans could assume leadership in critical areas such as air and missile defense, logistics networks, reinforcement routes into vulnerable regions like Poland and the Baltic states, and large-scale exercises—if US officers step back. Germany’s increased willingness to support these ideas has been pivotal, unlocking broader buy-in from the UK, France, Poland, Nordic countries, and others.
Regional coalitions form a key pillar. In Northern Europe, a British-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)—encompassing Baltic and Nordic nations plus Poland—stands out as a potential command hub. These countries share acute concerns about Russian aggression and possess compatible values and capabilities. Tripwire forces from larger members like Britain, France, and Germany are already positioned in the Baltics, meaning a significant portion of NATO’s European members would likely engage immediately in any conflict, regardless of full Article 5 activation.
France has been particularly proactive in its national planning. Defense scenarios increasingly assume European-only operations, especially for the Baltic Sea region. Frontline states (Poland, Baltics, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway) would handle delaying actions and territorial defense, supported by France, Germany, the UK, and others providing air power, naval assets, command, reconnaissance, and logistics. Estimates for such a defense suggest around 12 divisions (40–50 brigades) totaling approximately 200,000 troops, backed by a carrier strike group and multiple surface task forces.
Broader capability assessments paint a challenging picture. According to research from Bruegel and the Kiel Institute, Europe would need to mobilize about 300,000 additional soldiers across 50 brigades to counter Russia effectively without US support. This would require at least 1,400 new main battle tanks, 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles, and sustained production of around 2,000 long-range drones per year—exceeding current combined stocks of major powers like Germany, France, Italy, and the UK in some categories. Annual additional defense investments could reach €250 billion, pushing spending toward 3.5–4% of GDP.
Filling the Gaps: Progress and Persistent Challenges
European allies have moved quickly to address immediate shortfalls. NATO’s top military commander has noted that in many areas, Europeans have backfilled gaps left by US reductions through alternative capabilities and increased commitments. Joint procurement initiatives, EU defense funds, and bilateral projects (such as Germany-UK efforts on stealthy cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons) are gaining momentum. There is also emphasis on reducing dependence on US enablers like intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), air refueling, and strategic lift.
However, significant hurdles remain. Wargames, including one conducted by Die Welt in partnership with military researchers, have shown vulnerabilities: Russian forces could advance rapidly through NATO territory in initial phases, highlighting weaknesses in rapid reaction forces, logistics, and integrated air defense. Studies from think tanks like the Atlantic Council and CSIS underscore that while Europe holds numerical and economic advantages on paper, bureaucratic issues, readiness levels, and industrial capacity limit effective mobilization.
Nuclear deterrence adds another layer of complexity. Rutte has stressed that Europe would need its own robust nuclear capability—costing billions and taking years—while losing the US nuclear umbrella in a full decoupling scenario. The UK and France currently provide the European nuclear component, but extending credible coverage continent-wide requires further integration and investment.
Political will varies. While Poland, the Baltics, and Nordics push aggressively for buildup, some larger economies have been slower. Nonetheless, the consensus is shifting toward a “NATO 3.0” model: a rebalanced alliance with Europe leading conventional defense, supported by a continued (though reduced) US role, particularly in nuclear guarantees.
Strategic Implications
These developments represent a historic rebalancing of the transatlantic security relationship. For decades, Europe relied heavily on US power projection. Now, the continent is investing unprecedented sums in defense industrial capacity, joint projects, and force modernization. Summits, such as the one in Ankara, have focused on implementation, procurement deals worth tens of billions, and capability targets across domains like deep precision strike, uncrewed systems, and AI.
For Russia, a more capable and self-reliant European defense could strengthen deterrence, reducing the risk of miscalculation. However, near-term gaps could tempt aggression if perceived weaknesses persist. For the United States, a stronger European pillar aligns with goals of burden-sharing, freeing resources for other global challenges.
Experts caution that full strategic autonomy would demand not just money but deeper political integration—something that has proven elusive. A reformed NATO with a robust European component remains the most feasible path in the coming decade. As one analysis put it, the era of deferring hard choices has ended.
NATO’s European members are no longer passively awaiting US decisions. Through secret planning, accelerated spending, and coalition-building, they are forging a more autonomous defense posture. While challenges abound and complete independence from America is unrealistic in the short term, these efforts signal a maturing alliance better equipped for an uncertain future. The coming years will test whether Europe can translate plans and promises into credible military strength capable of deterring threats independently or in close partnership with a less forward-deployed United States.
About The Author
