In India, images of police swinging long bamboo sticks known as lathis during protests, strikes, or public gatherings frequently spark intense public debate. Critics call it excessive force and a colonial hangover. Supporters argue it is a necessary tool to restore order when crowds turn unruly. Yet amid the noise, one question remains central: what does the law actually permit?
Lathi charge, or baton charge, is not a term found in any statute. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) — the laws that replaced the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure — do not mention “lathi charge” by name. Instead, the law speaks of the use of force to disperse unlawful assemblies. The distinction is important. Force is permitted, but only under tightly defined conditions, and only to the minimum extent necessary.
An assembly becomes “unlawful” under Section 189 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita when five or more persons share a common object that falls into specific prohibited categories. These include overawing the Central or State Government or any public servant by criminal force or show of criminal force; resisting the execution of any law or legal process; committing mischief, criminal trespass or any other offence; forcibly taking possession of property or interfering with rights of way or water; or compelling any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit what he is entitled to do. Simply gathering to protest, even in large numbers, does not by itself make an assembly unlawful. The common object must be one of the prohibited kinds listed in the section.
Once an assembly is classified as unlawful, or when five or more persons are likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace, the law authorises dispersal. Section 148 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita gives this power to an Executive Magistrate, the officer in charge of a police station, or, in their absence, any police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector. The authorised officer may command the assembly to disperse. It then becomes the duty of every member of that assembly to disperse. If the assembly does not disperse, the same officer may use civil force to disperse it and may arrest and detain persons forming part of it.
If civil force proves insufficient and public security requires it, Section 149 of the BNSS allows the District Magistrate or another authorised Executive Magistrate to call in the armed forces. Even then, the law insists on restraint: the officer commanding the troops must use as little force, and cause as little injury to person and property, as is consistent with dispersing the assembly. Section 150 further allows certain armed force officers to act on their own initiative when public security is manifestly endangered and no magistrate can be contacted, but they must seek magisterial instructions as soon as communication becomes possible. Section 151 offers limited protection from prosecution for acts done in good faith under these provisions, though the protection is not absolute.
A parallel preventive power exists under Section 163 of the BNSS (the successor to the old Section 144 of the CrPC). An Executive Magistrate may issue orders to prevent obstruction, annoyance, injury, danger to human life, health or safety, or disturbance of public tranquillity. When such an order is in force and an assembly refuses to comply, force may follow. Again, the force must remain limited to what is necessary.
Courts have repeatedly underlined that these powers are not a blank cheque. The fundamental right to peaceful assembly and freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution remains intact. Restrictions must be reasonable and must serve the interests listed in Article 19(2) and (3). In the landmark case of Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2016), the Supreme Court examined a situation in which protesters had become violent and pelted stones. Even so, the Court held that the police continued the use of force beyond the point of necessity. The judges observed that once control is regained, continuing a lathi charge turns into a punitive and repressive act that violates human rights and dignity. The Court awarded compensation and stressed that force must stop the moment the threat ends.
Earlier High Court rulings have set out clear prerequisites. There must first be an unlawful assembly or an assembly of five or more persons likely to disturb the peace. An order to disperse must be given. The assembly must refuse to obey that order. Only then may force be used, and the force must be reasonable and proportionate. Police manuals in several states reinforce these principles. They require repeated warnings, adequate time for the crowd to leave, and, when sticks are used, preferential targeting of soft body parts below the waist. Blows to the head or collarbone are to be avoided as far as practicable.
The principle of minimum force is not merely a judicial preference; it is embedded in the statutory language itself. Section 149 of the BNSS explicitly requires “as little force… as may be consistent with dispersing the assembly.” International standards to which India is a party, including the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, echo the same requirement: in the dispersal of non-violent assemblies, force should be avoided if possible and, if used, kept to the minimum extent necessary.
In practice, the gap between legal standards and ground realities often becomes the source of controversy. When force is applied against peaceful demonstrators without a prior order to disperse, or when officers continue striking after the crowd has begun to scatter, the action moves outside the protective umbrella of the statute. Victims may seek remedies through writ petitions, claims for compensation, complaints before human rights commissions, or even criminal proceedings for excessive force once the limited immunity under Section 151 is pierced by evidence of bad faith or clear excess.
The colonial origins of the lathi as a crowd-control tool are undeniable. British-era police practice normalised its use, and the independent Indian state inherited both the instrument and the accompanying legal framework. Yet independence also brought constitutional guarantees that older colonial statutes did not recognise. The tension between the two continues to play out on the streets and in the courts.
Ultimately, the law draws a clear line. Police may use force, including lathi charge, to disperse an unlawful assembly that refuses lawful orders. They may not use it as a first response to inconvenience, political disagreement, or peaceful dissent. The force must be preceded by clear commands, limited to what is strictly necessary, and terminated the moment order is restored. Anything beyond that ceases to be lawful enforcement and becomes an actionable excess. In a constitutional democracy, that distinction is not a technicality. It is the difference between maintaining public order and undermining the very rights the order is meant to protect.
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