The Secret Phone Call That Armed India’s Jets: How Israel Quietly Turned the Tide in Kargil
Twenty-seven years after Indian forces reclaimed the icy heights of Kargil, two former Israeli Air Force officers have broken their silence for the first time on Indian television. In an NDTV exclusive timed with Kargil Vijay Diwas, Ami, the former Litening pod program manager at Rafael, and Shlomo, a veteran Israeli fighter pilot, detailed how Israel secretly and urgently equipped Indian Air Force fighter jets during Operations Vijay and Safed Sagar in 1999. Their account reveals a story of late-night phone calls, rapid technical improvisation, and a partnership forged under the pressure of high-altitude warfare that few outside defence circles fully understood until now.
The Kargil conflict erupted in the summer of 1999 when Pakistani regular troops and irregulars occupied strategic mountain positions overlooking the Srinagar-Leh national highway. These heights, some rising above 16,000 to 18,000 feet, gave the intruders a commanding view of Indian supply lines and civilian traffic. The Indian Army launched Operation Vijay to evict them. The Indian Air Force’s contribution, codenamed Operation Safed Sagar, began in late May after the government authorised limited use of air power—with one non-negotiable restriction: aircraft must not cross the Line of Control.
That restriction, combined with the extreme altitude, created unprecedented challenges. No air force in the world had previously fought a sustained campaign at such elevations. Thin air reduced aircraft performance. Bomb trajectories became unpredictable. Early strikes by MiG-21s, MiG-23s and MiG-27s using unguided bombs struggled to achieve the precision needed against well-fortified enemy positions dug into steep ridgelines. Surface-to-air threats further forced pilots to operate carefully. What the IAF urgently needed was the ability to strike accurately from safer distances and higher altitudes without violating the LoC.
India already possessed the solution on paper. In 1997 the country had signed a contract for Israeli Litening electro-optical targeting pods—fifteen for Jaguar aircraft and five for the Mirage 2000 fleet. These pods offered thermal imaging, high-resolution cameras and a laser designator capable of guiding bombs with pinpoint accuracy. The pods were meant to work with American Paveway laser-guided bomb kits. However, the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests triggered US sanctions. Critical components and fuses for the Paveway kits were withheld. The Mirage 2000’s weapon-delivery software, largely unchanged since the aircraft entered IAF service in the mid-1980s, also required significant modification before the Litening system could function reliably.
This is where Israel stepped in with unusual speed and discretion. According to the officers who have now spoken publicly, Israeli technical teams arrived in India and worked intensively alongside personnel from the IAF’s Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) in Bengaluru. The integration of Litening pods onto Mirage 2000 aircraft, along with compatible laser-guided munitions, was completed in approximately twelve days—an extraordinary turnaround under wartime conditions. High-risk test sorties followed to validate the system before operational deployment.
A pivotal moment in the narrative centres on a Friday night phone call from then-officer NAK Browne, who would later rise to become Chief of the Air Staff. The call underscored the urgency of the request and helped mobilise the rapid Israeli response. Israeli experts not only supplied hardware but shared practical expertise on operating the pods effectively in the unique Himalayan environment, where traditional assumptions about bomb ballistics and sensor performance no longer held.
Once the upgraded Mirages entered the fight, the impact was immediate and decisive. On 24 June 1999, Wing Commander Raghunath Nambiar (later Air Marshal) used a Litening pod to designate targets on Tiger Hill. The laser-guided bomb that followed destroyed key Pakistani positions, marking the first successful combat use of such munitions by the Indian Air Force. Subsequent sorties involving Nambiar and other pilots, including those associated with Air Marshal Tiwari’s operations, continued to pressure the heights. A particularly effective strike by a Mirage 2000 dropping a 250 kg bomb devastated a major Pakistani logistics depot at Muntho Dhalo, severely disrupting enemy supply lines and command networks.
These precision attacks allowed Indian ground forces to advance with reduced risk. The ability to hit specific bunkers, gun positions and supply dumps from medium altitude, while remaining within Indian airspace, changed the character of the air campaign. Although laser-guided bombs formed only a small portion of the total ordnance dropped during Safed Sagar, their psychological and operational effect was outsized. Enemy troops who had previously felt secure on the peaks now faced accurate aerial firepower that could reach them day or night.
Beyond the Litening pods, Israel also accelerated delivery of other critical items. Searcher and Heron unmanned aerial vehicles provided real-time surveillance of Pakistani positions. Mortar ammunition and related stores were rushed forward despite external pressure from the United States and other countries urging delays in arms shipments to India. Israel chose to honour existing contracts and meet Indian operational needs. The combination of precision targeting, better intelligence and reliable munitions helped shorten the conflict and contributed directly to the eventual eviction of the intruders.
The revelations by Ami and Shlomo place these technical achievements in human context. Ami’s role in the Litening program meant he understood both the capabilities of the system and the challenges of adapting it quickly to a new aircraft and an unfamiliar combat environment. Shlomo’s experience as a fighter pilot allowed him to appreciate the operational risks Indian aircrew faced and the generational leap the new technology represented for the Mirage fleet. Their willingness to speak after nearly three decades underscores how the episode remains a defining chapter in the India-Israel defence relationship.
That relationship had roots stretching further back. During earlier conflicts, including limited assistance in 1962 and more substantial discreet support in 1971, Israel had already demonstrated a willingness to provide practical help even when formal diplomatic ties did not exist. Diplomatic relations were established only in 1992. By 1999 the partnership had matured enough for rapid, high-stakes technical collaboration under combat conditions. The success in Kargil accelerated trust and paved the way for deeper cooperation in subsequent decades, spanning UAVs, missiles, electronics and joint development projects that continue today.
The Kargil air campaign remains unique in military history. It was the highest-altitude sustained air war ever fought. It demonstrated that precision-guided munitions and advanced targeting systems could neutralise the advantages of high ground without requiring aircraft to overfly enemy territory. It also showed that quiet, professional cooperation between two nations facing their own security challenges could produce results that pure diplomacy sometimes cannot.
As India marks another anniversary of the victory, the officers’ accounts add texture to a story long known in outline but rarely told from the Israeli side. A Friday night phone call, a team of technicians working against the clock, a new targeting pod bolted onto familiar aircraft, and a series of carefully executed sorties over the mountains—these elements combined to give Indian forces a decisive edge. The bond forged in those weeks of intense collaboration continues to shape defence ties between New Delhi and Jerusalem. In the thin air above Kargil, technology, urgency and mutual trust proved as important as courage.
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