Russia Forced to Import Petrol from India as Ukrainian Drone Strikes Trigger Historic Fuel Crisis
Russia, long one of the world’s leading crude oil producers and exporters, has been compelled to import petrol from India to alleviate severe domestic shortages caused by sustained Ukrainian drone attacks on its refining infrastructure. The development represents a remarkable reversal in energy trade flows: India, which has emerged as the largest buyer of discounted Russian crude since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, is now shipping refined fuel back to Moscow. Shipments totaling at least 60,000 to 67,000 metric tonnes have already been dispatched, with additional cargoes expected as Russia struggles to stabilize supplies during the peak summer demand season.
Ukrainian forces have intensified a campaign of long-range drone strikes targeting oil refineries, fuel depots, and related infrastructure deep inside Russian territory. These attacks, which Kyiv has described as “long-range sanctions” designed to degrade Russia’s ability to fund and sustain its war effort, have damaged a substantial portion of the country’s refining capacity. Independent estimates place the offline capacity at between 25 and 40 percent, with some analyses suggesting even higher temporary disruptions. Refining throughput has fallen to levels not seen in more than two decades, leaving domestic production unable to meet demand. At the start of July, Russian refineries were covering only about 65 percent of seasonal petrol needs. Daily gasoline consumption typically exceeds 110,000 tonnes during the summer months, when agricultural activity, tourism, and private vehicle use peak, creating a structural shortfall of roughly 25,000 tonnes per day.
The consequences have been felt across much of Russia. Fuel rationing or sales restrictions have been reported in dozens of regions—estimates range from 56 to as many as 60 of the country’s federal subjects—including the Moscow area. Drivers have faced long queues, purchase limits of 20 to 100 litres per vehicle, and, in some cases, temporary station closures. The situation has been particularly acute in Russian-occupied Crimea, where authorities declared a state of emergency amid disrupted logistics and repeated strikes on supporting infrastructure. Even major cities have not been spared. The Kapotnya refinery, a key supplier of fuel to the capital, was hit multiple times and is expected to remain offline for an extended period.
President Vladimir Putin publicly acknowledged the shortages in late June, stating that Ukrainian strikes had created “obvious” problems and a “certain shortage,” though he insisted the issues were “not critical.” He pledged to accelerate repairs, strengthen defenses around critical sites, draw on reserves, and increase fuel imports. Russian authorities have already banned petrol and jet fuel exports for extended periods and considered broader restrictions on diesel to prioritize the domestic market. Parliament approved tax amendments offering subsidies for imports, with rates linked in part to Indian delivery costs and prices to make overseas purchases economically viable.
The decision to source petrol from India underscores the depth of the crisis. According to industry sources and ship-tracking data, at least 60,000 metric tonnes of gasoline were dispatched from India in the initial wave, with one prominent cargo of approximately 42,000 tonnes originating at Nayara Energy’s Vadinar refinery in Gujarat. The fuel was loaded onto the tanker Agni in mid-June, later transferred to another vessel off the Egyptian coast, and tracked heading toward a northern Russian terminal such as Beloye More. Nayara Energy, in which Russia’s state-controlled Rosneft holds a 49 percent stake, has been processing predominantly Russian crude—more than 90 percent of its feedstock in 2026, according to analytics firms—following European sanctions that complicated alternative supplies. This creates a striking irony: Russian oil is shipped thousands of kilometres to India, refined into petrol, and then sent back an even longer distance to Russian ports at a significantly higher cost than domestic production would have entailed.
Indian officials have been careful to distance the government and domestic companies from direct involvement. Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Hardeep Singh Puri stated that Indian firms are not selling fuel directly to Russia, though he acknowledged it was possible that Indian-origin product was reaching Russian buyers through international traders. Nayara itself has said it has neither sold nor plans to sell fuel to Russian companies and remains focused on the Indian market. The transactions appear to have been arranged via commodity traders, a common mechanism in global oil markets that allows for flexibility amid sanctions and geopolitical constraints.
India’s role in this episode builds on its dramatically expanded energy relationship with Russia. Since 2022, Indian refiners have absorbed large volumes of discounted Russian crude, helping Moscow redirect exports away from European markets. In June 2026, Indian imports of Russian oil reached record levels, exceeding 2.6 million barrels per day and accounting for more than half of India’s total crude intake in some periods. Refineries such as those operated by Indian Oil Corporation, Reliance Industries, and Nayara have the capacity and commercial incentive to process this oil into products for both domestic consumption and export. The current shipments of petrol to Russia illustrate how these refining assets can, under pressure, also serve Moscow’s immediate needs.
Imports from India form only part of Russia’s response. Belarus has sharply increased rail deliveries of gasoline, with volumes rising several-fold in recent months. Russia is also drawing down strategic reserves—estimated in some reports at around 1.7 million tonnes, enough to cover roughly two months of the current deficit under optimistic assumptions—and racing to repair damaged facilities. However, Ukrainian forces have continued to target sites under repair, complicating recovery efforts and raising the possibility that the capacity losses could become more structural if the strike campaign persists.
The broader implications extend beyond immediate fuel queues. For Russia, the crisis highlights vulnerabilities in its energy sector despite vast crude production. Refining capacity has proven more fragile than crude extraction, and the need to import finished products erodes the economic advantage of being a major oil exporter. Higher costs for imported fuel, combined with subsidies and lost export revenues, add pressure to an economy already strained by wartime spending and sanctions. Domestically, prolonged shortages risk public discontent, particularly if they affect agriculture, transport, and daily mobility.
For Ukraine, the campaign demonstrates the effectiveness of asymmetric long-range capabilities in imposing costs on Russia far from the front lines. By systematically targeting refining infrastructure, Kyiv aims to constrain the resources available for the war while forcing Moscow to divert air defenses and repair capacity. Analysts note that a significant share of Russia’s refining system now lies within the operational reach of Ukrainian strike systems.
Looking ahead, the effectiveness of the Indian and other imports remains uncertain. Even at the planned scale of up to 400,000 tonnes per month from multiple sources, seaborne and rail deliveries can only partially offset a daily shortfall measured in tens of thousands of tonnes. Logistics challenges, higher costs, and the risk of further Ukrainian strikes mean that stabilization will depend heavily on successful repairs and the absence of major new damage. As summer demand continues and the conflict shows no sign of abating, Russia’s unexpected reliance on Indian petrol stands as a vivid illustration of how the war has reshaped global energy flows—and exposed the limits of even a petrostate’s self-sufficiency.
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