CIA and Mossad Shift to Human Intelligence in Hunt for Iran’s Elusive Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei
Five months after assuming the highest office in the Islamic Republic, Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, remains one of the most closely guarded and least visible figures in the Middle East. American and Israeli intelligence agencies have intensified a joint effort to determine whether he is alive, where he is hiding, and what condition he is in—relying increasingly on human intelligence rather than the electronic surveillance tools that once proved effective against his father.
According to reports citing current and former intelligence officials, Mojtaba Khamenei has maintained a near-total digital blackout since late February 2026. He has made no mobile phone calls and has not used a laptop or other electronic devices for approximately five months. This deliberate isolation has forced the CIA and Mossad to pivot toward classic human intelligence methods: identifying and tracking couriers who carry handwritten messages, recruiting individuals with access to his inner circle, and mapping the small network of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members believed to know his location.
Mojtaba, 56, was selected as Supreme Leader by the Assembly of Experts on March 8, 2026, less than two weeks after a US-Israeli airstrike on a leadership compound in Tehran killed his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The younger Khamenei had long been viewed as a powerful behind-the-scenes operator with deep ties to the IRGC and the security apparatus. Unlike his father, who maintained a more visible public presence, Mojtaba has historically avoided the spotlight. His complete disappearance from public view since the February 28 strike has only deepened the mystery.
Intelligence assessments suggest he may have suffered serious facial injuries during the attack that killed his father and, according to some reports, his wife. Analysts believe he has retreated into a heavily fortified underground facility, possibly in the tunnel networks beneath Tehran or a military bunker near the religious city of Qom, roughly 145 kilometers south of the capital. Fear of detection by American spy satellites is cited as one reason he avoids emerging into daylight. Some former officials have also raised the possibility that Iranian authorities are employing body doubles and rotating secure locations, tactics reminiscent of those used by other high-value targets in the past.
The technological methods that previously yielded results have largely failed. During the lead-up to the February strike, Western and Israeli agencies had successfully monitored Iranian leadership movements through a combination of signals intelligence, satellite imagery, and even compromised traffic camera networks in Tehran. Those tools provided high-confidence information about Ali Khamenei’s location at a critical leadership meeting. Against Mojtaba, the same approach has produced little. With no digital footprint to exploit, the agencies have turned to the slower, riskier, and more traditional craft of human intelligence.
Former Mossad division chief Rami Igra has described the challenge in stark terms. He compared the effort to the difficult search for hostages in Gaza, noting that even extensive technical measures sometimes fall short without reliable human sources. “Even if Mojtaba does not use a phone,” Igra observed, “if he is alive he will be using some means of communication, like small pieces of paper, and there will be multiple layers of couriers delivering them.” The parallel to the CIA’s successful tracking of Osama bin Laden through one of his trusted couriers is frequently drawn. Mossad and CIA officers are reportedly working to identify those intermediaries, hoping a single misstep or recruitment could provide the breakthrough.
Only a handful of IRGC members—perhaps as few as two or three—are believed to know how to reach the Supreme Leader directly. This extreme compartmentalization makes recruitment extraordinarily difficult. Iranian security services subject those close to the leadership to rigorous vetting, and the ongoing conflict has heightened paranoia across the regime. Yet intelligence officers note that people remain the weakest link in any security system. Couriers can be observed, followed, pressured, or turned. Personal grievances, financial incentives, or ideological disillusionment can open doors that technology cannot.
The operation is not described as an assassination plot. Officials emphasize that the immediate priorities are confirmation of life, location, and physical condition. Uncertainty about the Supreme Leader’s status complicates strategic assessments in Washington and Jerusalem. Some US intelligence evaluations conducted before and during the conflict have suggested that Mojtaba may be more inclined than his father toward the development of nuclear weapons, though those assessments rely largely on older information. Clarity about who is actually issuing orders in Tehran remains incomplete. Iranian state media and officials have offered little transparency, attributing the leader’s absence to security concerns amid continued hostilities.
The broader context is a region still reeling from the early 2026 escalation. The killing of Ali Khamenei marked a dramatic escalation in the long-running confrontation between Iran and its adversaries. The subsequent selection of his son as successor was widely interpreted as a defiant signal that the hardline core of the Islamic Republic would not yield to external pressure. Mojtaba’s low public profile, however, has fueled speculation about the true distribution of power inside the regime. Some observers question how much direct control he exercises, while others note that the IRGC’s influence has only grown in the vacuum of visible civilian leadership.
Human intelligence operations of this sensitivity carry significant risks. Agents and sources inside Iran operate under constant threat of detection and severe punishment. The history of Western intelligence work in the country is littered with both successes and costly failures. Yet the absence of electronic trails has left little alternative. Satellites can watch roads and facilities. Signals intelligence can intercept phone calls and emails. None of that helps when the target refuses to generate a digital signal and communicates only through trusted human chains.
For now, the search continues largely in the shadows. Intelligence agencies on both sides of the Atlantic and in Israel are methodically working the courier networks, cultivating potential recruits, and cross-checking fragmentary reports about possible bunker locations. The goal is straightforward but extraordinarily difficult: to reestablish contact with reality in a system that has deliberately gone dark. Whether Mojtaba Khamenei is recovering from injuries deep underground, directing affairs through a narrow circle of loyalists, or facing a more serious health crisis remains an open question. Until human sources provide clearer answers, Iran’s new Supreme Leader will continue to govern—or at least be said to govern—from an undisclosed location, protected by the oldest methods of secrecy in a high-tech age.
The episode underscores a enduring truth of modern intelligence work. Advanced technology can illuminate many secrets, but when a determined adversary chooses to live offline, success still depends on people who can get close enough to see, hear, and report what machines cannot.
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