Trump May Drop Nuclear Deal Push and Declare Victory if Iran Fully Reopens Strait of Hormuz
US President Donald Trump is privately weighing an exit strategy from the prolonged confrontation with Iran that prioritises the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz over a formal nuclear agreement, according to a Wall Street Journal report published on August 9, 2026. Senior aides have been told that Trump could walk away without securing a comprehensive deal on Tehran’s nuclear programme if commercial shipping through the vital waterway is restored and Iran’s nuclear capabilities remain contained.
The shift reflects months of difficult diplomacy, repeated ceasefire breakdowns, and mounting domestic pressure as American midterm elections approach and energy prices remain elevated. Trump has spent weeks preparing the ground for such an outcome, viewing the restoration of free passage through the strait as a tangible win that could allow him to declare the conflict a success.
The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow chokepoint between Iran and Oman through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil typically flows, has been at the centre of the conflict since it intensified in early 2026. Iran has repeatedly restricted traffic, used missile and drone attacks on vessels, and sought to assert control or extract fees, while the United States has enforced a naval blockade of Iranian ports and rejected any Iranian tolls or restrictions on its warships. Earlier interim arrangements, including a June 2026 memorandum of understanding that was meant to reopen the waterway and create space for nuclear talks, repeatedly collapsed amid mutual accusations of violations.
Trump’s current calculus rests on two assessments. First, he believes the military campaign has already achieved critical objectives against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. US forces destroyed three major Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025, and Trump has told aides that Tehran would struggle to restart a meaningful programme during the remainder of his presidency. He argues that American intelligence assets would quickly detect any attempt to rebuild those sites or pursue a covert weapons path, and that the threat of renewed US military action would serve as a lasting deterrent. At a NATO summit earlier in the summer, Trump downplayed concerns about Iran’s remaining highly enriched uranium stockpile, suggesting it was effectively out of reach.
Second, an open and secure Strait of Hormuz would ease global energy markets, reduce pressure on US petrol prices, and deliver a visible achievement that the administration can present to the American public. Officials indicated that if the waterway is fully reopened and the nuclear threat stays contained, Trump could extend the existing ceasefire indefinitely and lift the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Iran, however, has raised the bar significantly. On Saturday, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, publicly outlined a sweeping list of conditions that Tehran says must be met before the strait reopens. According to Iranian state media, these include a permanent end to the war, the lifting of the US naval blockade, the withdrawal of American forces from the region, the removal of all sanctions, the release of Iran’s frozen overseas assets, payment of war reparations running into billions of dollars, an end to US threats and insults, and a halt to American military actions against Iran’s regional militia allies. Tehran has also insisted that American warships should not transit the waterway and has sought revenue from commercial vessels—demands Washington has consistently rejected.
These conditions have complicated Trump’s preferred exit ramp. The financial demands in particular create a major obstacle. Trump has publicly ruled out handing American taxpayer money to Iran, yet officials acknowledge that any workable arrangement would likely require some unfreezing of Iranian assets, possibly under conditions, and limited sanctions relief that would allow Iran to resume oil sales. Previous temporary waivers collapsed when fighting resumed, and restoring them would mark a significant concession.
The original impetus for the US military campaign centred on preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. That goal has not been formally abandoned. Vice President JD Vance has stressed that the administration continues to press for long-term changes in Iranian behaviour. Yet the practical difficulty of locking Tehran into a durable, verifiable nuclear arrangement—while simultaneously managing the daily risks to shipping and the political calendar at home—has elevated the importance of the strait. Officials describe a pragmatic recalibration: if the most immediate source of leverage Iran holds over global markets is removed and the nuclear programme remains degraded and monitored, a formal treaty may no longer be treated as an absolute prerequisite for de-escalation.
Energy markets and domestic politics form an important backdrop. Higher fuel prices have been a persistent political vulnerability, and Trump has made clear that restoring the free flow of oil is a priority. Allies in the Gulf and Asian importers who depend on the waterway have also pushed for stability. At the same time, hardliners in both Washington and Tehran remain sceptical. Some in the US administration and among Republican hawks view any outcome that leaves Iran’s nuclear programme without strict, long-term constraints as incomplete. In Tehran, the ability to disrupt Hormuz continues to be seen as essential leverage against economic isolation and military pressure.
The path forward remains uncertain. Talks involving intermediaries such as Oman have continued in fits and starts, focused in recent weeks more on practical arrangements for shipping routes than on the deeper nuclear and sanctions issues. Trump has previously threatened massive military escalation while also signalling openness to deals that deliver immediate results. Iran’s latest list of demands suggests Tehran is prepared for a longer contest rather than a quick settlement on American terms.
For now, the White House appears to be testing whether a limited, verifiable reopening of the Strait of Hormuz—coupled with continued intelligence monitoring and the implicit threat of renewed strikes—can provide a politically and strategically acceptable off-ramp. Whether that calculation holds will depend on Tehran’s willingness to loosen its grip on the waterway without extracting the full suite of concessions it has listed, and on whether Trump judges that containment of the nuclear programme is sufficient to claim victory. The coming weeks will show whether the administration is prepared to formalise this shift or whether the nuclear issue will once again move back to the centre of negotiations.
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