A senior adviser to the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has outlined a stark strategic vision for the ongoing conflict with the United States: prolong the fighting until President Donald Trump leaves office. The comments, delivered in an interview with PBS NewsHour, frame time itself as a weapon. By dragging out the confrontation through 2028 and into early 2029, Tehran hopes to impose sustained costs on Washington, gain combat experience, and establish a durable deterrent against any future American administration considering military action against the Islamic Republic.
Mohammad Reza Naqdi, a senior adviser to the IRGC commander-in-chief, stated the objective clearly. “We have to establish deterrence so that the enemy never dares to attack us, so we can live with security,” he said. “One way is to prolong this war until we get to the next term of the presidency and cause attrition, so that if anyone else wants to attack Iran, they will know there is a cost.” The remarks mark one of the most explicit public linkages yet by a high-ranking Iranian military figure between the duration of the current conflict and the political calendar in Washington.
Naqdi claimed Iran is already winning the war even if its final objectives remain unmet. He argued that the longer the fighting continues, the more valuable battlefield lessons Tehran accumulates. “The longer this war lasts, the more experience we gain. We had never seen a real war to gain real experience to learn how to fight with America. In these five months, we have learned how,” he said. “We have also seen how the American military is weaker than what we perceived.” According to Naqdi, Iranian forces have observed confusion and shifting objectives on the American side, with goals changing every few days—from threats to seize Kharg Island to efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
On the material side of the conflict, Naqdi offered a confident assessment of Iran’s missile capabilities. He asserted that the country is producing more missiles each day than it is firing. Production, he claimed, is dispersed across multiple locations, making it difficult for airstrikes or sabotage to shut down the entire network. Even if the war stretched for years, Iran could continue launching rockets. In a particularly pointed warning, he suggested that running out of missiles would not end Iran’s ability to inflict pain. At that point, he said, Tehran could become more dangerous by targeting the thousands of American economic interests scattered around the world.
These statements arrive against the backdrop of a conflict that has already reshaped energy markets, regional security calculations, and domestic politics in both countries. The fighting, which has involved American and Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets alongside Iranian missile and drone responses, has severely disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The vital waterway, through which a significant portion of the world’s oil normally passes, has seen traffic reduced to a fraction of normal levels for extended periods. Oil prices have risen in response, and major consuming nations have drawn down strategic reserves. The United States has maintained a naval presence and blockade measures against Iranian ports, while Tehran has conditioned any full reopening of the strait on the lifting of that pressure and other concessions.
President Trump has publicly portrayed the campaign as a success. He has claimed total American control over the Strait of Hormuz, describing the naval blockade as a “wall of steel” that Iran cannot break. In recent statements he has depicted the Iranian military as depleted, its leadership uncertain, its economy shattered by inflation estimated in some reports at around 300 percent, and its remaining forces unpaid and demoralized. Trump has at times signaled openness to ending major hostilities if Iran meets key conditions, including free passage through the strait, while simultaneously keeping the option of further military pressure on the table. His administration has also leaned on economic sanctions and financial isolation as tools to force Tehran toward compliance.
Iranian officials, however, have shown little inclination to accept American terms. Foreign ministry statements have rejected demands for compensation as part of any settlement and insisted that the strait will remain restricted until the United States lifts its naval blockade and addresses other Iranian grievances. Senior figures have framed the conflict as one in which Iran has already demonstrated resilience. By surviving intense strikes and continuing to project power through missiles and proxies, the leadership argues, the Islamic Republic has disproven assumptions about its fragility. The strategy articulated by Naqdi fits within a broader pattern of Iranian strategic patience: manage the intensity of confrontation, raise the political and economic price for the adversary, and wait for domestic pressures in the United States to create openings.
The political dimension is central to the Iranian calculation. Trump’s current term ends in January 2029. Iranian hardliners appear to believe that a prolonged conflict will erode American public and elite support for open-ended military engagement in the Middle East. Rising energy costs, potential American casualties, and the distraction from other domestic priorities could, in this view, make continuation of the war increasingly costly for any president facing reelection pressures or midterm elections. By the time a new administration takes office, Tehran hopes the memory of the costs will deter future presidents from repeating the experiment.
This approach carries risks for Iran as well. Sustained American and Israeli strikes have degraded elements of Iran’s military infrastructure, command networks, and proxy capabilities. The Iranian economy, already strained by years of sanctions, faces additional pressure from disrupted oil exports and the costs of wartime production. Domestic hardship could eventually generate internal political challenges. Yet Iranian officials consistently emphasize the regime’s ability to endure pain and its relative indifference to further leadership losses. They portray survival itself as a form of victory and argue that the United States, as a global power with far-flung interests, is more vulnerable to a strategy of attrition than a country fighting on or near its own territory.
Regional dynamics complicate the picture further. Gulf Arab states that host American forces and depend on stable energy flows have found themselves caught between the two sides. Some have quietly urged de-escalation while carefully avoiding open alignment that would invite Iranian retaliation. Israel continues to view the conflict through the lens of its own security concerns regarding Iranian nuclear ambitions and support for groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Any extended period of instability in the Persian Gulf risks broader economic fallout that would affect Europe, Asia, and global supply chains.
Diplomacy has so far produced limited results. Indirect contacts and intermediary efforts have occurred, but fundamental gaps remain. The United States has demanded significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, an end to support for regional proxies, and free navigation through the strait. Iran has sought sanctions relief, the lifting of the naval blockade, compensation for wartime damage, and recognition of a new regional security balance more favorable to its interests. Neither side appears prepared to make the concessions the other considers essential. As a result, the conflict has settled into a pattern of managed confrontation rather than decisive resolution.
Naqdi’s comments suggest that at least some influential voices in Tehran prefer this status quo to a rapid settlement that might leave Iran vulnerable to future pressure. By framing the war as a multi-year process tied to the American political cycle, Iranian strategists are signaling that they see no urgent need to negotiate from a position of weakness. Experience gained on the battlefield, continued missile production, and the ability to disrupt global energy markets are treated as assets that grow more valuable over time.
Whether this strategy can succeed remains uncertain. Prolonged conflict could eventually produce military or economic breakthroughs that neither side currently anticipates. Domestic political shifts in the United States or Iran could alter incentives. External actors, from China and Russia to European powers and Gulf states, may increase pressure for a settlement if the economic costs become intolerable. Yet the public articulation of a long-war doctrine by a senior IRGC adviser indicates that Tehran is preparing for the possibility that the fighting will not end on Trump’s preferred timeline.
For now, both capitals appear locked in a contest of endurance. Washington continues to combine military pressure, economic sanctions, and occasional diplomatic outreach. Tehran responds with missile launches, restrictions on maritime traffic, and a narrative of resilience and inevitable victory. The remarks by Mohammad Reza Naqdi have made the Iranian side of that calculation unusually transparent: if attrition can be sustained until a new American president takes office, the costs imposed during these years may serve as a lasting deterrent. The coming months and years will test whether that wager holds.
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