Spy Expert Exposes Chinese Communist Party’s Global Intelligence Empire and the Danger of a London Super Embassy
Professor Anthony Glees, a leading British authority on intelligence and secret agencies, has issued a stark warning about the scale and methods of the Chinese Communist Party’s worldwide intelligence operations. In a detailed analysis, the emeritus professor at the University of Buckingham describes a system that seeks to know everything about everything, operates with total ruthlessness, and treats Europe—not merely as a trading partner—but as a long-term political and economic prize. At the centre of his concerns sits the planned Chinese “super embassy” at Royal Mint Court in London, which he labels an act of strategic folly that could become the hub for espionage across the entire continent.
Glees begins by clarifying a fundamental distinction in intelligence work. Officers do not usually carry out the spying themselves. Their primary task is to identify, recruit, and handle agents who gather the secrets. In the Chinese system this process is shaped by a crucial legal reality: Chinese law imposes a duty on every citizen to cooperate with the country’s intelligence services when required. For Chinese nationals or people of Chinese heritage living in the United Kingdom, this creates powerful leverage. Family members remaining in China can be pressured, threatened, or used as hostages to compel cooperation. Beyond coercion, recruitment also relies on personal relationships, financial inducements, and other tailored incentives. The result is a human intelligence network that is both extensive and difficult for open societies to counter.
Two pillars define communist intelligence culture, according to Glees. The first is the determination to collect information on an almost unlimited scale. Chinese services do not restrict themselves to classic military secrets such as the number of warheads on a Trident missile. They also seek practical knowledge that could prove useful in a crisis: how to disrupt power supplies, transport systems, or communications; where political leaders might relocate in an emergency; and which individuals in positions of influence have personal vulnerabilities that can be exploited. The second pillar is ruthlessness. Glees notes the historical readiness of communist secret police organs to employ extreme measures—including violence, sabotage, and severe human rights abuses—in pursuit of information and control.
This approach is not abstract. Glees argues that Beijing prepares for the possibility of confrontation even while preferring to avoid open war with Europe. In any future crisis, Chinese planners want the ability to dismantle or neutralise potential threats from NATO countries. Comprehensive intelligence collection is the foundation of that capability. The physical presence of a large embassy makes such work far easier. Embassies have long served as bases for intelligence officers under diplomatic cover. A vastly expanded facility in the heart of London would concentrate resources, personnel, and operational capacity.
Glees is particularly scathing about the Royal Mint Court project. He describes the decision to permit it as “an act of folly, of stupidity of the first magnitude.” The new complex would not merely support intelligence activity directed at the United Kingdom. It would function as a regional headquarters for Chinese espionage across Europe. Its location near critical communications infrastructure adds another layer of concern, although Glees acknowledges that much digital collection can already be conducted remotely. He is sceptical of official reassurances. While MI6 has publicly indicated acceptance of the project—partly under government direction and with an eye to reciprocal facilities in Beijing—MI5 is described as markedly less enthusiastic. Concentrating officers in one location does not, in Glees’s view, make surveillance simpler. Tracking individual intelligence officers remains a resource-intensive, one-to-one activity whether they operate from a central embassy or from dispersed addresses.
The threat extends well beyond traditional diplomatic premises. British universities have become another important arena. Research collaborations, funding arrangements, and recruitment of academic talent can inadvertently assist Chinese military modernisation and technological advancement. Glees highlights how Chinese intelligence prioritises human sources alongside technical collection. In an open academic environment, access to cutting-edge research and talented researchers offers high returns with relatively low risk of detection. This “whole-of-society” dimension distinguishes the Chinese model from more narrowly professional Western intelligence services. State-owned enterprises, private technology firms, United Front organisations, and individual citizens can all be pressed into service when required.
Under Xi Jinping the strategic objectives have become clearer and more ambitious. Glees contrasts China’s approach with that of Russia. While Moscow under Vladimir Putin focuses on recovering lost Soviet-era influence and territory, Beijing looks further ahead—into the twenty-second century. Europe represents the major prize. The goal is not necessarily formal conquest but the gradual alignment of European political and economic interests with those of China. A Europe whose manufacturing, technology, and policy choices run in parallel with Beijing’s priorities would represent a profound shift in global power. Control over critical infrastructure, influence over elite opinion, and deep knowledge of decision-making processes all serve this longer-term aim.
Glees is careful to note the asymmetry between systems. China is a totalitarian party-state that maintains tight control over its own population and extends that control abroad through pressure on diaspora communities and influence operations. Liberal democracies protect free speech, independent institutions, and the rule of law. This difference makes reciprocal arrangements inherently unequal. Western diplomats and intelligence officers operating in China face severe restrictions and surveillance; Chinese counterparts in open societies enjoy far greater freedom of movement and association. Treating the two as equivalent is, in Glees’s judgement, a category error.
The scale of the challenge is significant. Western agencies have repeatedly warned that Chinese intelligence activity is larger and more persistent than most public discussion acknowledges. Collection efforts range from cyber operations and technology theft to the monitoring of dissidents and the cultivation of political and commercial contacts. Glees’s analysis places these activities within a coherent party-led strategy rather than isolated incidents. Regime security and the expansion of national power are treated as inseparable objectives. Intelligence collection, political influence, technology acquisition, and economic leverage reinforce one another.
Critics of a harder line toward China often emphasise the economic benefits of engagement and the risks of decoupling. Glees does not deny those economic realities, but he insists that security considerations cannot be subordinated indefinitely. Allowing a major intelligence hub to be established in the capital of a key European power while universities continue to host sensitive research collaborations sends a signal of complacency. History offers cautionary parallels. Western democracies underestimated the determination and organisational capacity of Soviet intelligence for decades. Glees suggests that a similar underestimation of Chinese capabilities and intentions is now underway.
The practical implications are clear. Governments need clearer public assessments of the risks posed by large diplomatic facilities belonging to adversarial states. Universities require stronger scrutiny of research partnerships that could have military applications. Counter-intelligence resources must match the scale of the human intelligence effort directed against open societies. Above all, policymakers must recognise that Chinese intelligence work is not a series of opportunistic acts but the product of a systemic approach that has been refined over decades.
Professor Glees’s intervention is not alarmist for its own sake. It is a call for realism about the nature of the Chinese Communist Party’s intelligence apparatus and the strategic choices currently being made in Western capitals. The planned super embassy at Royal Mint Court has become a symbol of those choices. Whether it proceeds, and under what conditions, will say a great deal about how seriously European governments take the challenge of competing with a determined, well-resourced, and ideologically driven intelligence power.
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