Why the Kremlin Continues Targeting Apple Years After It Stopped Selling iPhones in Russia
Apple formally suspended product sales and most operations in Russia in early 2022, shortly after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Official retail channels for new iPhones, iPads, and other devices closed. Corporate support scaled back dramatically. Yet more than four years later, Russian authorities remain locked in a persistent campaign of pressure against the American company. Demands for explanations, antitrust cases, threats of multimillion-dollar fines, and public calls for users to abandon iPhones continue to surface. The contradiction is striking: Apple no longer sells devices through authorized channels in Russia, yet the Kremlin treats the company as an active problem requiring ongoing intervention.
The core of the latest confrontation centers on the App Store and mandatory software. In June 2026, Apple removed the state-backed messaging app Max from the Russian App Store and disabled push notifications for existing installations. Max, launched in 2025 as a domestic alternative to WhatsApp and Telegram, is heavily promoted by authorities and has been legally required to come preinstalled on smartphones and tablets sold in the country. Apple said the removal was necessary to comply with sanctions. Russian digital development officials accused the company of arbitrarily restricting access for millions of iPhone users without adequate explanation.
Shortly afterward, Apple also removed a suite of applications linked to VK, the major Russian internet holding that operates social networks, messaging tools, video platforms, and other services used by tens of millions of people daily. VK protested that its apps had been taken down without warning or prior notice and insisted the company was not under sanctions at the time of the removals. Apple again cited compliance with sanctions rules. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded by demanding a direct explanation from the company. He warned that failure to provide one would force Russia to “draw conclusions” about any further cooperation with Apple. Peskov also suggested that frustrated users simply switch to Android devices, where the affected apps remained available.
These moves did not occur in isolation. Russia’s Federal Anti-Monopoly Service had already been pressing Apple over what it described as discriminatory treatment of domestic software. Authorities required preinstallation of Max and the national app store RuStore on devices running iOS. After issuing a warning with a mid-July 2026 deadline, the regulator noted that Apple had partially complied by enabling a Russian search engine in a software update. It had not, however, implemented the requirements for Max and RuStore. In early August 2026, the service opened a formal antitrust case. Apple faces a potential fine of up to 4 billion rubles—roughly $50 million—if found in violation of competition rules.
The legal pressure continued into late August. VK filed a lawsuit in a Moscow arbitration court seeking an order for Apple to restore its applications, reinstate push notifications, and pay substantial daily penalties until compliance. The dispute underscores how residual technical control over the App Store still gives Apple influence even after its commercial exit.
Despite the official withdrawal, Apple devices never disappeared from Russian hands. Parallel imports and grey-market channels have kept a steady supply of iPhones flowing into the country from Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and other jurisdictions. These unofficial routes account for the large majority of units sold. Industry estimates have put the share of “grey” or fully illegal imports as high as 70 percent in recent periods, with legitimate parallel importers struggling to compete on price. Sales volumes have declined from earlier peaks, yet iPhones still capture a disproportionately high share of smartphone revenue—around 27 percent in some reports—because buyers of Apple products tend to spend more. One major operator reported roughly 1.4 million iPhones sold in a recent year, generating over 100 billion rubles in revenue.
This enduring consumer preference helps explain the Kremlin’s continued focus. iPhone owners form a relatively affluent segment of the market. Controlling the software environment on those devices matters for broader goals of digital sovereignty. Russian authorities have spent years trying to reduce reliance on Western platforms, block or restrict foreign messaging and social services, and promote domestic alternatives that can be more easily monitored or integrated with state systems. In 2025 alone, Russia led the world in government requests for App Store removals, asking Apple to take down 1,213 apps—far more than any other country. Many of those requests targeted VPN tools used to bypass internet censorship.
Critics of the government argue that apps such as Max are designed with surveillance capabilities in mind. Officials reject those claims and frame their actions as necessary responses to foreign companies that refuse to cooperate on security, data localization, or content moderation. From Moscow’s perspective, Apple’s decisions to remove Russian services look like political discrimination rather than neutral legal compliance. From Apple’s perspective, operating under Western sanctions regimes leaves little room for compromise once certain entities or functionalities fall under restrictions.
The practical effects for Russian iPhone users have been cumulative. Official App Store purchases and subscription renewals became difficult or impossible in some periods after payment processing was restricted. FaceTime and other services have faced blocks. Popular domestic apps lose visibility and functionality when removed from the store. Software updates still arrive, but the ecosystem feels increasingly fragmented. Many users continue to prefer iPhones for their hardware quality, security features, and existing libraries of apps and accessories. Others have begun shifting toward Android devices, partly because of official encouragement and partly because the software experience has grown more constrained.
Raids on grey-market suppliers and efforts to register device identifiers add further uncertainty. Authorities have examined import schemes, cryptocurrency payments, and documentation at major electronics markets. At the same time, officials have publicly stated they do not intend to mass-disable existing iPhones through technical means. The goal appears less about eliminating the devices overnight and more about gradually reducing their privileged status and forcing greater alignment with domestic rules.
The broader pattern fits Russia’s post-2022 approach to Western technology companies. Firms that left or scaled back have still faced asset issues, regulatory pressure, or political criticism. In Apple’s case, the combination of a large installed base, high-value consumers, and the company’s control over a closed software platform makes it a particularly visible target. The company no longer maintains a meaningful corporate presence or authorized sales operation, yet its products and services remain woven into daily digital life for a significant portion of the population.
As of mid-to-late 2026, there is no indication that either side is prepared to fully disengage. Apple continues to cite legal compliance as the reason for App Store actions. Russian regulators continue to open cases, issue demands, and frame the company as uncooperative. Parallel imports keep devices available. Consumers keep buying them. The result is a prolonged, low-level confrontation that highlights the limits of commercial exit in an interconnected technology market. Official sales may have ended years ago, but the political and regulatory attention has not. The Kremlin’s persistent efforts against Apple demonstrate how control over software ecosystems and user data remains a strategic priority even when the hardware itself arrives through unofficial channels.
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