Why Bangladesh PM Tarique Rahman’s India Visit Stalled Over Sheikh Hasina
Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s long-anticipated first official visit to India has been indefinitely stalled, exposing the deep fractures that continue to define relations between the two South Asian neighbours nearly two years after the dramatic political upheaval of 2024. What was meant to signal a reset in ties has instead become a stark reminder of how the unresolved status of ousted former prime minister Sheikh Hasina continues to cast a long shadow over diplomacy in the region.
Rahman, the son of late BNP leader Khaleda Zia and a figure who spent years in exile himself, assumed office in February 2026 after a landslide electoral victory. His government inherited a bilateral relationship that had deteriorated sharply following the student-led uprising that toppled Hasina’s long-ruling Awami League government in August 2024. Hasina fled to India, where she has remained in exile ever since. For many in Bangladesh, India’s decision to host her became a symbol of New Delhi’s past closeness to her authoritarian rule and a source of lingering resentment.
In the months after Rahman took power, both sides made cautious moves toward engagement. India appointed a political figure, former minister Dinesh Trivedi, as its high commissioner to Dhaka—an unusual choice that signalled the importance New Delhi attached to the relationship. High-level contacts resumed, and Indian officials floated the idea of a standalone bilateral visit by Rahman. Dates in the third week of August 2026, particularly around 21-22 August, were discussed. India also extended a separate invitation for Rahman to attend the BRICS outreach session in September in his capacity as chair of BIMSTEC. Preparations advanced far enough that Rashtrapati Bhavan briefly issued a notice about a ceremonial welcome rehearsal, only to withdraw it hours later when it became clear the visit would not proceed as planned.
The immediate trigger for the collapse of these plans was a virtual press conference addressed by Sheikh Hasina on 5 August 2026. Speaking from India to journalists at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club in New Delhi to mark two years since her ouster, Hasina criticised the 2024 uprising and reiterated her intention to return to Bangladesh. The event, though audio-only and not organised by the Indian government, provoked a sharp reaction in Dhaka. Bangladesh’s Foreign Ministry declared that the interaction had “vitiated” the atmosphere surrounding Rahman’s proposed visit. Officials insisted that a “propitious” or “conducive environment” needed to be created before any trip could go ahead.
Dhaka linked the demand for a better atmosphere to two concrete requests: the extradition of Hasina, who was sentenced to death in absentia by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal for crimes against humanity related to the 2024 crackdown, and the handover of other fugitives, including those accused in the killing of activist Sharif Osman Hadi. Bangladesh has repeatedly invoked the 2013 extradition treaty between the two countries. India has maintained that the requests are under examination through established legal procedures and has declined to treat them as a political bargaining chip.
Indian officials have been careful in their public responses. External Affairs Ministry spokespersons have stressed that India wants a “positive, constructive and forward-looking” relationship based on mutual interest and reciprocity. High Commissioner Trivedi conveyed that Prime Minister Narendra Modi desired the visit to be “memorable” and “honourable.” India has also clarified that it neither organised nor endorsed Hasina’s media appearance. Yet these assurances have done little to bridge the gap. Bangladesh’s foreign affairs adviser Humayun Kabir and other officials have signalled that there is “no rush” and that any meeting must align with Bangladesh’s national interest and reflect recognition of the sacrifices of the 2024 uprising.
The Hasina issue is only the most visible fault line. Several other points of friction have accumulated. Bangladesh has accused India of pushing undocumented migrants across the border without following agreed procedures, while India has complained of growing anti-India rhetoric and attacks on Hindu minorities. The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty is due to expire in December 2026, and Dhaka has sought clarity on its extension or renegotiation. Energy cooperation remains critical for Bangladesh, which continues to face power shortages and relies on Indian electricity supplies, yet political distrust has slowed progress on new projects. Trade continues, with bilateral merchandise trade still substantial, but the broader atmosphere of mistrust has limited high-level momentum.
Geopolitically, the relationship is being reshaped by Bangladesh’s efforts to diversify its partnerships. Since the change of government, Dhaka has expanded engagement with China, the United States, Türkiye and even Pakistan—moves that New Delhi watches warily. Analysts note that under Hasina, India enjoyed an unusually favourable strategic position in Bangladesh. That era is over. Rahman’s government has emphasised a “Bangladesh First” policy grounded in sovereign equality and non-interference, language that reflects both domestic political pressures and a desire to correct what many in Dhaka saw as an imbalance in the previous relationship.
Not everyone sees the stalling of the visit as purely a matter of principle. Some Indian commentators and former diplomats have argued that Bangladesh is using the Hasina issue to play to domestic audiences while still counting on Indian cooperation in practical areas such as power and connectivity. Others in Bangladesh counter that India has been slow to accept the new political reality and continues to treat Hasina’s presence as a lever rather than a liability. A few observers suggest the extradition demand itself may be partly performative: actually receiving Hasina could create awkward legal and political complications for the current Bangladeshi government.
Despite the current chill, neither side appears prepared for a complete rupture. Geography remains an immutable factor. The two countries share a 4,096-kilometre border, deep economic linkages, and overlapping security concerns. Business delegations have continued to travel, and technical discussions on energy and trade have not entirely stopped. Indian officials have kept the invitation open, and Bangladeshi counterparts have not ruled out a meeting at a later date if the atmosphere improves.
For now, however, the visit remains without a confirmed schedule. The episode has revealed how difficult it remains for India and Bangladesh to move beyond the events of 2024. Tarique Rahman’s trip was supposed to inaugurate a new chapter. Instead, its delay has underscored that Sheikh Hasina’s exile, her political activities from Indian soil, and the unresolved questions of accountability and sovereignty continue to define the limits of engagement. Until both capitals find a way to manage—if not resolve—this central irritant, high-level diplomacy will remain constrained by the past.
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