Evaluating Pakistan’s Path Toward BRICS Membership

The global geopolitical landscape is undergoing a structural realignment as emerging powers seek to construct a more multipolar order. At the forefront of this shift is BRICS—a bloc originally comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. In recent years, the group has morphed into a platform representing roughly half the world’s population and a massive share of global economic output.

Seeking to capitalize on this rebalancing, Islamabad officially submitted a formal request to join BRICS in late 2023. For Pakistan, admission offers a crucial gateway to economic stabilization, trade diversification, and multilateral leverage. However, the central question remains: Can Pakistan actually join BRICS? While the legal mechanisms of the bloc permit application, Pakistan faces formidable political, diplomatic, and economic hurdles—chief among them the absolute veto power held by its arch-rival, India.

Understanding the BRICS Admission Standard

To assess Pakistan’s prospects, one must first examine how BRICS expands. Unlike international bodies governed by binding charters or mechanical majority voting, BRICS operates on a strict rule of consensus. Every current full member possesses an implicit, unyielding veto.

The formal accession framework generally progresses through three stages:

• Expression of Interest: A candidate state formally signals its intent to the chair or Secretariat.
• Potential Member / Partner Designation: The bloc places the applicant on a curated list for closer bilateral and multilateral evaluation.
• Full Admission: Achieving unanimous approval from every standing member state, culminating in a formal invitation to sign accession agreements.

In practice, this consensus requirement means that technical readiness or strategic alignment with some member states is insufficient. A candidate must maintain functional, cooperative diplomatic relationships with all standing members.

The Great Diplomatic Wall: India’s Veto Power

The single most insurmountable barrier to Pakistan’s full membership is India. New Delhi is a founding member of BRICS and holds significant sway over the bloc’s direction. Given decades of historical animosity, territorial disputes over Kashmir, and ongoing allegations regarding cross-border terrorism, India views Pakistan’s inclusion as a direct threat to its national interest and the cohesion of the forum.

From India’s diplomatic perspective, admitting Pakistan would risk importing bilateral South Asian conflict into a multilateral economic bloc. New Delhi fears that Pakistan could use BRICS summits to air regional grievances or stall initiatives, much like the dynamics that historically paralyzed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Consequently, as long as decisions require absolute consensus, India’s veto will effectively block Pakistan’s entry as a full member.

Strategic Alliances: Support from Beijing and Moscow

While New Delhi poses an institutional block, Islamabad is not without powerful allies inside the bloc. Both China and Russia have expressed varying degrees of support for Pakistan’s integration into BRICS frameworks.

The Chinese Pillar: China remains Pakistan’s most vital strategic ally. Through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—a flagship component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—Beijing has invested billions in Pakistani infrastructure. For China, integrating Pakistan into BRICS aligns with its broader ambition to expand the bloc’s geographic footprint across Eurasia and amplify the representation of friendly developing nations.

The Russian Vector: Russia has actively courted non-Western global partnerships to counter Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Islamabad’s formal application was submitted directly with Russian support during Moscow’s rotational presidency of the bloc. Moscow views Pakistan as a key Eurasian stakeholder, particularly regarding regional security and trade corridors connecting Central Asia to South Asia.

However, even the combined diplomatic weight of Beijing and Moscow cannot override the consensus rule. While China and Russia can advocate for Pakistan, they cannot compel India to drop its opposition.

Economic Fundamentals: A Fragmented Pitch

Diplomatic alignments aside, BRICS was conceived primarily as a engine for high-growth emerging economies. While recent expansions have broadened the group’s political scope, economic capability remains a fundamental criterion for candidate viability.

Here, Pakistan presents a complicated case:

• Fiscal Fragility: Pakistan’s economy has suffered years of severe inflation, foreign exchange shortages, and structural debt, frequently requiring standby bailouts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
• Industrial Base: Compared to recent BRICS entrants like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, or Indonesia, Pakistan offers lower fiscal capital and higher sovereign credit risks.
• Institutional Alignment: BRICS seeks member states capable of contributing to global liquidity mechanisms, infrastructure funds, and cross-border trade settlements in local currencies. Pakistan’s immediate dependence on Western-dominated financial institutions makes it a recipient of aid rather than a contributor to regional development funds.

Alternative Pathways: Partner Status and the New Development Bank

Recognizing that full membership remains blocked by India, Pakistan’s diplomatic foreign service has pivoted toward pragmatic workarounds. The BRICS architecture provides two major non-membership avenues for participation.

1. The BRICS Partner Country Status

At the 2024 Kazan Summit, BRICS formally instituted a “Partner State” category. This status is designed for nations seeking structured engagement without granting full voting rights or summit-veto power. While becoming an official partner still requires general consensus, the political threshold is lower than full membership. Securing partner status would allow Pakistan to join ministerial consultations, trade initiatives, and working groups, offering a middle path forward.

2. The New Development Bank (NDB)

Perhaps the most viable economic route for Pakistan is joining the Shanghai-based New Development Bank (NDB). Crucially, NDB membership is decoupled from full BRICS political membership. For example, Bangladesh and Uruguay were approved as NDB member states without becoming full BRICS members. Joining the NDB would grant Pakistan access to alternative development capital for green energy, logistics, and infrastructure without requiring India to concede on full political admission.

Can Pakistan Join?

Legally and procedurally, Pakistan is fully eligible to apply and join BRICS. Politically, however, its prospects for full accession in the near term remain nearly zero.

So long as BRICS maintains its core governance principle of decision-making by consensus, India’s strategic interest in blocking Pakistan’s bid acts as an insurmountable institutional barrier. China and Russia may advocate for Islamabad, but they will not risk fracturing the internal stability of BRICS to force Pakistan’s entry.

In the immediate future, Pakistan’s strategic trajectory within BRICS will rely on partial integration. By seeking admission to the New Development Bank and courting “Partner Country” status, Pakistan can access many of the economic benefits of the bloc without triggering a veto from New Delhi. Until a fundamental rapprochement occurs between Islamabad and New Delhi, Pakistan will remain an active observer at the threshold of BRICS rather than a full member at its table.

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