On paper, Xi Jinping is China’s most powerful ruler since Mao Zedong. Holding the three apex titles—General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), President of the People’s Republic, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)—Xi has eliminated constitutional term limits, written his personal ideology into the party charter, and centralized authority to an extent unseen in decades. Yet beneath this veneer of absolute control lies an enduring vulnerability.
Over the past decade, and with renewed ferocity in recent years, Xi has systematically arrested, demoted, and purged dozens of top military commanders. From defense ministers like Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe to commanders of the strategic PLA Rocket Force and members of the Central Military Commission itself, China’s high-command ranks have faced an unrelenting storm of scrutiny. This relentless purging reveals a fundamental paradox: why does a leader possessing complete systemic dominance remain chronically suspicious of his own armed forces?
The Iron Rule: “The Party Commands the Gun”
To understand Xi’s unease, one must examine the institutional DNA of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Unlike modern Western militaries, which swear allegiance to a national constitution or an abstract state apparatus, the PLA is explicitly an armed political wing of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong laid down the foundational doctrine: “Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.”
The existential threat to any authoritarian regime rarely originates from disorganized popular uprisings; it emerges from men with access to weapons and organized command structures. If the military develops independent political ambitions, personal loyalties, or institutional autonomy, the CCP ceases to hold a monopoly on power.
When Xi assumed leadership in late 2012, he inherited a military establishment that had drifted dangerously into self-interest. Former CMC vice-chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou had built vast networks of patronage, selling military commissions, profiting from state land development, and running operational fiefdoms with minimal political oversight. Xi recognized that an army loyal to internal power brokers could quickly become a staging ground for a palace coup or bureaucratic resistance. His primary objective became restoring the Party’s absolute supremacy over the armed forces.
Patronage Networks and the Peril of Alternate Loyalties
Dictatorships function through patronage, but personal factions present an inherent threat to the supreme leader. Within the PLA, regional cliques, shared service histories, and decades-long mentorship ties historically determined promotion. A general who owes his career to an influential superior will instinctively look to that patron rather than the party center.
Xi has dismantled these historic power structures. Through far-reaching structural overhauls in 2015 and 2016, he dissolved the traditional four military headquarters (General Staff, General Political, General Logistics, and General Armaments) and replaced them with 15 functional departments operating directly beneath the CMC. He converted former regional military regions into five joint Theater Commands, breaking apart entrenched geographic fiefdoms.
However, replacing old networks creates new vulnerabilities. Even commanders handpicked by Xi have fallen under suspicion. When an authoritarian ruler promotes a loyalist, that officer immediately begins accumulating institutional authority and building a subordinate network of their own. For Xi, the emergence of any cohesive military bloc represents a rival center of gravity that must be disrupted before it can coalesce into an organized political challenge.
The Blight of Corruption and False Military Readiness
Xi’s official rationale for cashiering senior officers is his sweeping anti-corruption campaign. Western observers often dismiss these campaigns as mere political theater, but military corruption poses an operational crisis that directly jeopardizes Xi’s broader strategic vision.
Xi has directed the PLA to complete military modernization by 2035 and become a “world-class military” capable of challenging the United States by 2049. A crucial component of this vision is the capability to project decisive force across the Taiwan Strait. Yet pervasive graft severely undermines this objective:
- Procurement Fraud: Billions of yuan funneled into weapons research and development have been siphoned off through inflated contracts, sub-standard materials, and kickbacks.
- Compromised Deterrence: Internal inquiries within the PLA Rocket Force—the custodian of China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missile arsenal—revealed systemic issues ranging from faulty missile silo lids to systemic fuel mismanagement.
- Institutional Dishonesty: In an autocratic system where promotions depend on pleasing superiors, commanders frequently stage sanitized military drills, embellish unit capabilities, and conceal operational defects.
If Xi cannot trust his generals’ assessments of combat readiness, he risks committing the PLA to a high-stakes regional conflict only to encounter catastrophic failure. The prospect of military defeat carries grave regime-ending risks for authoritarian leaders; an army that fails on the battlefield often turns its weapons inward.
The Fear of Internal Dissent Over Taiwan
A conflict over Taiwan presents the most consequential gamble of Xi Jinping’s political career. Achieving “national reunification” is central to his personal historical legacy and the realization of the “Chinese Dream.” However, high-ranking military commanders understand modern joint warfare far better than civilian cadres.
A cross-strait amphibious invasion represents one of the most complex, hazardous military operations in modern history, demanding seamless synchronization across naval, air, rocket, cyber, and logistics branches. Military professionals recognize that failure could lead to catastrophic casualties, international economic isolation, and devastating strikes on mainland infrastructure.
Xi’s anxiety stems partly from the fear that his generals harbor private skepticism regarding the feasibility or timing of an invasion. Commanders who drag their feet, present cautious assessments, or discreetly question aggressive geopolitical timelines can easily be perceived not as prudent strategists, but as disloyal dissenters. By maintaining continuous instability within the senior ranks, Xi ensures that no officer gains enough bureaucratic weight to push back against the center’s strategic directives.
The Trappings of Permanent Paranoia
The ongoing purges have placed the PLA in a structural bind. By prioritizing political loyalty and ideological obedience over operational competence, Xi risks cultivating a high command populated by sycophants who tell him what he wishes to hear rather than delivering candid operational realities. Frequent dismissals disrupt long-term strategic planning, breed careerism and paralysis among middle-ranking officers, and degrade morale across frontline units.
Ultimately, Xi Jinping’s wariness toward his generals is an unavoidable feature of autocratic rule. In a system without constitutional succession mechanisms, transparent institutional governance, or legal safeguards, power is retained through coercion. The very military that protects Xi from external adversaries and domestic unrest is simultaneously the only institution possessing the organized capability to unseat him. Until the fundamental nature of the party-army relationship evolves, China’s supreme leader will continue to watch his own commanders with the same vigilance he directs toward his adversaries.
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