Who Could Lead Iran If Mojtaba Khamenei Dies? Top Contenders in the Supreme Leader Succession Race
Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has remained almost entirely out of public view since the Assembly of Experts appointed him in early March 2026, days after his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in joint US-Israeli strikes. Months of silence, combined with conflicting reports about serious injuries sustained in the same attack, have intensified speculation about his health and capacity to govern. Recent accounts from sources close to the Iranian government and Israeli media have described his condition as critical in some cases, while Iranian officials continue to insist he remains alive and involved in decision-making through written messages and intermediaries. The prolonged absence of the country’s highest authority has revived a long-standing question that the Islamic Republic has faced only once before in its history: what happens if the Supreme Leader dies or becomes permanently unable to perform his duties?
Iran’s constitution provides a clear, if tightly controlled, mechanism for this scenario. Under Article 111, if the Supreme Leader dies, resigns, is removed, or becomes temporarily or permanently incapacitated, a three-member Interim Leadership Council immediately assumes his powers. The council consists of the President of Iran (currently Masoud Pezeshkian), the Head of the Judiciary (currently Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei), and a senior religious jurist from the Guardian Council, chosen according to procedures involving the Expediency Council. This temporary body exercises the full authority of the Supreme Leader while the 88-member Assembly of Experts, a body of senior Shiite clerics elected under strict vetting by the Guardian Council, selects a permanent successor “as swiftly as possible.” In practice, the process is shaped far more by informal negotiations among hardline clerical networks, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and other security institutions than by open debate.
The Assembly of Experts is dominated by principalists and hardliners loyal to the system established by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and consolidated under Ali Khamenei. This composition makes a radical shift toward reform or moderation highly unlikely. Any successor would need both sufficient religious credentials and the backing of the security establishment, particularly the IRGC, which has grown even more central to regime survival since the 2026 conflict. Continuity of hardline policies on nuclear issues, regional influence, and domestic control would almost certainly remain the priority.
Several names consistently surface as the most plausible contenders should a vacancy arise. Ayatollah Alireza Arafi stands out as one of the strongest institutional candidates. Born in 1959 in Meybod, Arafi has spent decades climbing the clerical and administrative ladder. He heads Iran’s nationwide seminary system, has served as Friday Prayer Leader in Qom, sits on the Guardian Council, and is a member (and former deputy chairman) of the Assembly of Experts. He also served on the Interim Leadership Council immediately after Ali Khamenei’s death. Arafi is viewed as a reliable “man of the system”—technically competent, ideologically aligned with the hardline core, and experienced in managing the religious institutions that underpin the theocracy. His low public profile and lack of an independent power base could actually work in his favor, as he presents fewer risks of internal division than more charismatic or factionally polarizing figures.
Ayatollah Hashem Hosseini Bushehri is another senior cleric with deep roots in the Qom establishment. As temporary Friday Prayer Leader of Qom and a high-ranking figure in the Assembly of Experts, Bushehri possesses strong religious credentials and institutional standing. He is closely linked to the bodies that manage succession and has maintained a relatively low domestic political profile. Analysts often describe him as a safe continuity candidate who would likely preserve the existing balance of power between the clerical hierarchy and the security forces without introducing major disruptions.
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, the current Head of the Judiciary, brings a different profile. A longtime hardliner with extensive experience in intelligence, security, and judicial roles—including a controversial stint as intelligence minister during the 2009 protests—he already sits on the Interim Leadership Council by virtue of his position. Mohseni-Ejei was reappointed to another five-year term as judiciary chief in a message attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei earlier in 2026, signaling continued trust from the leadership. While he is more of a security and enforcement figure than a pure high-ranking marja (source of emulation), his institutional power and hardline record make him a serious contender or, at minimum, a key kingmaker in any succession process.
Hassan Khomeini, grandson of the Islamic Republic’s founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and custodian of his grandfather’s mausoleum, represents the main alternative with reformist or moderate associations. At 53, he is younger than many other candidates and carries significant symbolic weight as a direct descendant of the revolution’s founder. However, his relatively moderate reputation and history of friction with hardline institutions have left him sidelined from the core power centers. Most observers believe the Assembly of Experts, stacked with principalists, would be reluctant to elevate him unless broader political pressures or a desire for symbolic legitimacy forced a compromise.
Other names that have circulated in past succession discussions include Ayatollah Mohammad-Mahdi Mirbagheri, an ultra-hardliner who heads the Qom Academy of Islamic Sciences and sits on the Assembly of Experts, as well as figures such as Mohsen Araki and members of the influential Larijani network. In wartime or crisis conditions, the IRGC’s preferences would likely prove decisive. The Guards already exercise enormous influence over security, the economy, and foreign policy; any candidate they view as insufficiently committed to their interests would face severe obstacles.
Beyond individual names, the structural dynamics matter. The experience of Mojtaba’s own selection showed that hereditary succession remains controversial within a system founded on the rejection of monarchy, yet practical considerations of continuity and IRGC support can override ideological purity. A sudden vacuum could also open the theoretical possibility of a collective leadership council rather than a single Supreme Leader, though this remains a distant constitutional option rather than a probable outcome.
The broader implications of another leadership transition would be profound. Iran faces ongoing external pressure, economic strain, and internal legitimacy challenges. A smooth hardline succession would signal regime resilience and continuity of confrontational policies. A messy or contested process, by contrast, could expose fractures between clerical institutions, the IRGC, and political factions, potentially accelerating instability. For now, the system is designed to prioritize survival and ideological continuity above all else. The Assembly of Experts and the security establishment would almost certainly seek a figure who can maintain the existing order rather than experiment with reform.
As speculation about Mojtaba Khamenei’s health continues, the question of succession is no longer purely hypothetical. The constitutional machinery is ready, the key institutions are dominated by hardliners, and a shortlist of experienced clerics and officials is already well known within Iranian power circles. Whoever eventually emerges would inherit not only the formal title of Supreme Leader but also the enormous challenge of steering the Islamic Republic through one of the most turbulent periods in its history.
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